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Abstract
Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market, the e¢ cient
bargaining model and the monopsony model, we provide two extensions of a microeconomic
version of Halls framework for estimating price-cost margins. We show that both product
and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the produc-
tion function and their corresponding shares in revenue, that can be characterized by a
joint market imperfections parameter. Using an unbalanced panel of 10646 French rms
in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978-2001, we can classify these industries
into six di¤erent regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the
labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the
product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (IC-EB), followed by a regime
of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage
bargaining in the labor market (IC-PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the
product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC-MO). For each of these three
predominant regimes, we assess within-regime rm di¤erences in the estimated average
price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the
Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true rm dispersion. As a way to assess
the plausibility of our ndings in the case of the dominant regime (IC-EB), we also relate
our industry and rm-level estimates of price-cost mark-up and (relative) extent of rent
sharing to industry characteristics and rm-specic variables respectively.
JEL classication : C23, D21, J51, L13.
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1 Introduction
In a world of perfect competition, the output contribution of individual production factors
equals their respective revenue shares. In numerous markets, however, market imperfections
and distortions are prevalent. The most common sources for market power in product markets
are product di¤erentiation, barriers to entry and imperfect information. The sources of market
power are similar in labor markets. The labor economics literature is currently dominated by
rent-sharing models where, for example, costs of hiring, ring and training can be exploited by
employees to gain market power. Those models generate wage di¤erentials that are unrelated to
productivity di¤erentials and hinder the competitive market mechanism. Recently, however, the
monopsony model has regained considerable attention. In this model, contrary to the standard
rent-sharing models, search frictions or heterogeneous worker preferences for job characteristics
generate upward sloping labor supply curves to individual rms, thus giving some market power
to employers.
Since the 1970s, models of imperfect competition have separately permeated many elds of
economics ranging from industrial organization (see Bresnahan, 1989; Schmalensee, 1989 for
surveys) to international trade (e.g. Krugman, 1979; Brander and Spencer, 1985) to labor eco-
nomics (see Booth, 1995; Manning, 2003 for surveys). In recent years, there has been a small
number of studies that simultaneously consider imperfections in the product and the labor mar-
kets (Bughin, 1996; Crépon et al., 1999, 2005; Dobbelaere, 2004; Dumont et al., 2006; Neven et
al., 2006; Abraham et al., 2009; Boulhol et al., 2010).1 By estimating jointly price-cost mark-
ups in the product market and the extent of rent sharing in the labor market, these studies
contribute to bridging the gap between the econometric literature on product market imperfec-
tions and the one on labor market imperfections. They basically follow two closely related but
distinct approaches: one which entails estimating a structural model including the full set of
explicitly specied factor share equations and the production function (Bughin, 1996; Dumont
et al. 2006 and Neven et al., 2006); the other extending Halls (1988) framework which relies
on estimating a reduced-form equation. Following this second approach and using a large panel
data sample of French manufacturing rms, this paper on the one hand extends the framework
of our previous work and on the other hand provides a detailed analysis of product and labor
market imperfections as two major sources of discrepancies between input factor prices and
marginal productivities. Thus it also contributes to the econometric literature on estimating
microeconomic production functions with rm panel data.2
We consider two extensions of a microeconomic version of Halls (1988) framework, respectively
consistent with a standard labor bargaining model and a model of rm monopsony in the labor
market. The rst extension follows Crépon et al. (1999, 2005) and presumes that employees
possess a degree of market power when negotiating with the rm over wages and employment
(e¢ cient bargaining model; McDonald and Solow, 1981). The second extension abstains from
the assumption that the labor supply curve facing an individual employer is perfectly elastic
(monopsony model; Manning, 2003). By comparing the factor elasticities for labor and materials
as directly estimated in rm production functions with their revenue shares, we obtain an
estimate of a parameter  of joint market imperfections, capturing (im)perfect competition in
both the product and the labor market. Depending on the sign and statistical signicance of
this estimate, we can assess if the labor bargaining model or the monopsony model prevails, and
hence derive estimates of the price-cost mark-up and extent of rent-sharing parameters  and
 in the rst case, or the price-cost mark-up and labor supply elasticity parameters  and "Nw
in the second case.
1For theoretical contributions on this issue, we refer to Nickell (1999) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
2For a survey of this literature, see Griliches and Mairesse (1998) and Ackerberg et al. (2006).
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We use an unbalanced panel of 10646 French rms in 38 manufacturing industries over the
period 1978-2001 to estimate a standard Cobb-Douglas production function for each of these
38 industries. From the estimated industry-specic output elasticities for labor and materials
and from their average revenue shares, we derive the industry-specic joint market imperfections
parameter  j . Depending on its sign and statistical signicance, we classify industries in distinct
regimes that di¤er in terms of the type of competition prevailing in both markets. We thus
distinguish 6 regimes:
(1) Perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage
bargaining in the labor market, noted PC-PR
(2) Imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage
bargaining in the labor market, noted IC-PR
(3) Perfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market,
noted PC-EB
(4) Perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market, noted
PC-MO
(5) Imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market,
noted IC-EB
(6) Imperfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market, noted
IC-MO
IC-EB is by far the most predominant regime, followed by IC-PR and PC-MO. For each of
these regimes separately, we do not only consider industry di¤erences in the estimated labor
and materials output elasticities and shares and in the estimated product and labor market
imperfection parameters, but we also investigate the underlying rm-level di¤erences in these
various parameters. Following Mairesse and Griliches (1990), we adopt a random coe¢ cient
framework and use the Swamy (1970) variance decomposition approach to determine the degree
of true rm dispersion. Finally, as a way to assess the plausibility of our ndings in the case
of the dominant regime (IC-EB), we also relate our industry and rm-level estimates of price-
cost mark-up and (relative) extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and rm-specic
variables respectively.3
3Our analysis is most closely related to Mairesse and Griliches (1990), Crépon et al. (1999, 2005) and Dobbe-
laere (2004). Using a sample of about 450 manufacturing rms in France, 450 manufacturing rms in the US
and 850 manufacturing rms in Japan over the period 1967-1979, Mairesse and Griliches (1990) estimate the
degree of true dispersion in the output-capital coe¢ cient of a production function in the three countries. Using
a sample of 1000 French manufacturing rms over the period 1986-1992, Crépon et al. (1999, 2005) estimate a
Solow residual equation that gives estimates of average price-cost mark-up and average rent-sharing parameters
at the manufacturing level. Using a sample of 7086 Belgian rms in 18 manufacturing industries over the pe-
riod 1988-1995, Dobbelaere (2004) also uses the Solow residual normalization to analyze industry di¤erences in
estimated average price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing parameters. However, we believe that our article con-
tributes to the current state of research in distinct respects. Our analysis goes one step further than Mairesse and
Griliches (1990). From the estimated output-labor and output-materials coe¢ cients of a production function,
we derive estimates of product and labor market imperfection parameters and determine the degree of true dis-
persion in these parameters. Three important aspects distinguish our work from Crépon et al. (1999, 2005) and
Dobbelaere (2004). First, instead of using the Solow residual normalization, we follow the productivity literature
and estimate a production function to derive product and labor market imperfection parameters. Second, we
do not impose a priori the e¢ cient bargaining framework upon the data but we classify industries based on
the type of competition prevailing in the product and the labor market. Third, we quantify industry as well as
within-regime rm di¤erences in our market imperfection parameters and investigate how the industry and rm
estimates correlate with industry-specic and rm-specic variables respectively.
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We proceed as follows. Section 2 explains our theoretical framework and identication strategy.
Section 3 presents the data and shows for illustration the estimates of average output elasticities
and average market imperfection parameters that we nd for manufacturing industries as a
whole. In Section 4 we rst classify the 38 manufacturing industries in regimes di¤ering in
terms of the type of competition that is prevalent in the product and the labor market; we
then investigate industry di¤erences in the estimated parameters of interest within the three
predominant regimes; and in the case of the dominant regime we nally look at the plausibility
of such di¤erences in light of a few possibly related industry characteristics. In Section 5 we
briey recall the Swamy methodology to decompose an estimated rm parameter variance in a
sampling variance and a true variance, and then apply it to assess within-regime rm di¤erences
in the market imperfection parameters for the three predominant regimes; last, in the case
of the dominant regime similarly to what we do to conrm the plausibility of the industry
average estimates, we relate the rm-level market imperfection parameter estimates to a few
rm individual characteristics.
2 Theoretical and econometric framework
Halls (1988) approach for evaluating price-cost mark-ups hinges on one crucial assumption,
that is, rms consider input prices as given prior to deciding their level of inputs. In other
words, there is no imperfect competition in the labor market. Consistent with two models of
imperfect competition in the labor market that are widespread in the literature, the e¢ cient
bargaining model and the monopsony model, we reect on two extensions of Halls framework.
First, following Crépon et al. (1999, 2005), we presume that, for example, costs of ring, hiring
and training can be exploited by employees to gain market power when negotiating with the
rm over wages and employment (e¢ cient bargaining). In this framework, the rm price-cost
mark-up and the extent of rent sharing generate a wedge between output elasticities and factor
shares. Second, we abstain from the assumption that the labor supply curve facing an individual
employer is perfectly elastic (monopsony model). In this setting, the rm price-cost mark-up and
the rm wage elasticity of the labor supply curve elicit deviations between marginal products
of input factors and input prices. One point should be claried from the outset. We do not
envisage a labor market where there is monopsony sensu stricto, i.e. where the employer is the
sole employer in the labor market. Instead, the labor market that we have in mind is more
accurately described in terms of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition. The former refers
to a situation where employer market power persists despite competition with other employers.
The latter is equivalent to oligopsony with free entry, driving employers prots to zero. Both
extensions of Halls framework entail estimating a reduced-form equation that allows us to
identify the key parameters measures of product and labor market imperfectionsderived from
theory.
2.1 Perfect competition in the product and the labor market
We start from a production function Qit = itF (Nit; Mit; Kit), where i is a rm index, t
a time index, N is labor, M is material input, K is capital. it = Aei+ut+it , with i an
unobserved rm-specic e¤ect, ut a year-specic intercept and it a random component, is
an index of technical change or true total factor productivity. Denoting the logarithm of
Qit; Nit; Mit; Kit and it by qit; nit; mit; kit and it respectively, the logarithmic specication
of the production function gives:
qit = ("
Q
N )itnit + ("
Q
M )itmit + ("
Q
K)itkit + it (1)
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where ("QJ )it (J = N; M; K) is the elasticity of output with respect to input factor J .
Following Solow (1957), rms act as price takers in product and input markets. In a competitive
environment, the rm prices at marginal cost (CQ)it such that
Pit
(CQ)it
= 1. Assuming that labor
and material are variable input factors, short run prot maximization implies the following two
rst-order conditions:
("QN )it = (N )it (2)
("QM )it = (M )it (3)
where (N )it = witNitPitQit and (M )it =
jitMit
PitQit
are the share of labor costs and material costs in
total revenue respectively.
Assuming that the elasticity of scale, it = ("
Q
N )it + ("
Q
M )it + ("
Q
K)it, is known, the capital
elasticity can be expressed as:
("QK)it = it   (N )it   (M )it (4)
Inserting Eqs. (2), (3) and (4) in Eq. (1) and rearranging terms gives the following expression:
qit   kit = (N )it [nit   kit] + (M )it [mit   kit] + [it   1] kit + it (5)
2.2 Imperfect competition in the product market
2.2.1 Perfectly competitive labor market / Right-to-manage bargaining
Perfectly competitive labor market
As in the original Hall approach, rms operate under imperfect competition in the product
market and act as price takers in the input markets. Short-run prot maximization implies the
following two rst-order conditions:
("QN )it = it (N )it (6)
("QM )it = it (M )it (7)
where it =
Pit
(CQ)it
refers to the mark-up of output price Pit over marginal cost (CQ)it.
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Assuming that the elasticity of scale (it) is known, the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
("QK)it = it   it (N )it   it (M )it (8)
Inserting Eqs. (6), (7) and (8) in Eq. (1) and rearranging terms gives the following expression:
qit   kit = it [(N )it [nit   kit] + (M )it [mit   kit]] + [it   1] kit + it (9)
Estimating Eq. (9) allows the identication of the mark-up of price over marginal cost.
4The short-run prot function of an imperfectly competitive rm i at time t is given by: it = PitQit witNit 
jitMit. Prot maximization with respect to labor and materials implies: ("
Q
N )it =
h
1 + sitit
!it
i 1
(N )it and
("QM )it =
h
1 + sitit
!it
i 1
(M )it respectively, with sit market share, it the conjectural variations parameter
(= 1 if rms play Nash in quantities and = 0 if they play Nash in prices) and !it the price elasticity of demand.
Prot maximization with respect to output levels implies:
h
1 + sitit
!it
i 1
= Pit
(CQ)it
= it with Pit the output
price and
 
CQ

it
the marginal cost (see Levinsohn, 1993 for details). Substitution leads to Eqs. (6) and (7).
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Right-to-manage bargaining
Let us abstain from the assumption that labor is priced competitively. We assume that the
workers and the rm bargain over wages (w) but that the rm retains the right to set employment
(N) unilaterally (right-to-manage bargaining; Nickell and Andrews, 1983). Since, as in the
perfectly competitive labor market case, labor and material input are unilaterally determined
by the rm from prot maximization (see Eqs. (6) and (7) respectively), the mark-up of price
over marginal cost that follows from Eq. (9) is not only consistent with the assumption that
the labor market is perfectly competitive but also with the less restrictive right-to-manage
bargaining assumption.
2.2.2 E¢ cient bargaining
Each rm operates under imperfect competition in the product market. Following Crépon et
al. (1999, 2005), we assume that the workers and the rm are involved in an e¢ cient bargaining
procedure with both wages (w) and labor (N) being the subject of an agreement (McDonald
and Solow, 1981). It is the objective of the workers to maximize U(wit; Nit) = Nitwit+(N it 
Nit)wit, where N it is the competitive employment level (0 < Nit  N it) and wit  wit is the
reservation wage. Consistent with capital quasi-xity, it is the rms objective to maximize
its short-run prot function: it = Rit   witNit   jitMit, where Rit = PitQit stands for total
revenue. The outcome of the bargaining is the asymmetric generalized Nash solution to:
max
wit; Nit;Mit

Nitwit +
 
N it  Nit

wit  N itwit
	it fRit   witNit   jitMitg1 it (10)
where it 2 [0; 1] represents the bargaining power of the workers.
Material input is unilaterally determined by the rm from prot maximization: (RM )it = jit
with (RM )it the marginal revenue of material input, which directly leads to Eq. (7).
Maximization with respect to the wage rate and labor respectively gives the following rst-order
conditions:
wit = wit +
it
1  it

Rit   witNit   jitMit
Nit

(11)
wit = (RN )it + it

Rit   (RN )itNit   jitMit
Nit

(12)
with (RN )it the marginal revenue of labor.
Solving simultaneously Eqs. (11) and (12) leads to the following expression for the contract
curve:
(RN )it = wit (13)
Eq. (13) shows that under risk neutrality, the rms decision about employment equals the one
of a (non-bargaining) neoclassical rm that maximizes its short-run prot at the reservation
wage.
We denote the marginal revenue by (RQ)it and the marginal product of labor by (QN )it. Given
that it =
Pit
(RQ)it
in equilibrium, we can express the marginal revenue of labor as (RN )it =
(RQ)it (QN )it = (RQ)it ("
Q
N )it
Qit
Nit
=
Pit (QN )it
it
. Using this expression together with Eq. (13),
the elasticity of output with respect to labor can be written as:
("QN )it = it

witNit
PitQit

= it (N )it (14)
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Given that we can rewrite Eq. (11) as (N )it = (N )it +
it
1 it [1  (N )it   (M )it], Eq. (14)
is equivalent to:
("QN )it = it (N )it   it
it
1  it
[1  (N )it   (M )it] (15)
In the remainder of the article, we denote it1 it by it. Note that Eq. (15) discriminates between
the right-to-manage bargaining setting and the e¢ cient bargaining setting. In the right-to-
manage model, employment is highly endogenous with respect to wages. As in the perfectly
competitive labor market case, the marginal revenue of labor is equal to the wage whereas in
the e¢ cient bargaining model, employment does not directly depend on the bargained wage.
Hence, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, the null hypothesis of it = 0 in Eq. (15) does not only
correspond to the assumption that the labor market is competitive but also to the less restrictive
right-to-manage bargaining assumption.
Assuming that the elasticity of scale, it = ("
Q
N )it + ("
Q
M )it + ("
Q
K)it, is known, the capital
elasticity can be expressed as:
("QK)it = it   it (N )it + it
it
1  it
[1  (N )it   (M )it]  it (M )it (16)
Estimating the production function:
qit   kit = ("QN )it [nit   kit] + ("QM )it [mit   kit] + [it   1] kit + it (17)
allows us to obtain estimates of (1) the mark-up of price over marginal cost and (2) the extent
of rent sharing. Indeed, from Eq. (17) it follows that:
 it =
("QM )it
(M )it
  ("
Q
N )it
(N )it
= it
it
1  it

1  (N )it   (M )it
(N )it

(18)
to which we refer as the parameter of joint market imperfections in the remainder of the article.5
2.2.3 Monopsony
The model of Hall (1988) is based on the assumption that there is a potentially innite supply of
employees having a free and costless choice of a large number of employers for whom they might
work. Competition among these employers then results in a single market wage. A small wage
cut by the employer will result in the immediate resignation of all existing workers. In contrast,
the wage elasticity of the labor supply curve facing an individual employer is not innite when
the labor market is characterized by monopsony. There are a number of reasons why labor
supply might be less than perfectly elastic, creating rents to jobs. Paramount among these
are the absence of perfect information on alternative possible jobs (Burdett and Mortensen,
1998), moving costs (Boal and Ransom, 1997) and heterogeneous worker preferences for job
characteristics (Bhaskar and To, 1999; Bhaskar et al., 2002) on the supply side, and e¢ ciency
wages with diseconomies of scale in monitoring (Boal and Ransom, 1997) and entry costs on
the part of competing rms on the demand side. All these factors give employers nonnegligible
market power over their workers.
Consider a rm that operates under imperfect competition in the product market and faces a
labor supply Nit (wit), which is an increasing function of the wage wit. Both Nit (wit) and the
5From Eq. (18), it is clear that to accommodate two imperfectly competitive markets, we need at least two
variable input factors to identify the model. Going beyond Hall (1988) is hence not possible when starting from
a value added specication.
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inverse of this relationship wit (Nit) are referred to as the labor supply curve of the individual
rm. The monopsonist rms objective is to maximize its short-run prot function, taking the
labor supply curve as given:
max
Nit;Mit
(wit; Nit; Mit) = Rit(Nit; Mit)  wit (Nit)Nit   jitMit (19)
Maximization with respect to material input gives (RM )it = jit, which is equivalent to Eq. (7).
Maximization with respect to labor gives the following rst-order condition:
wit =
("Nw )it
1 + ("Nw )it
(RN )it (20)
where ("Nw )it 2 <+ represents the wage elasticity of the labor supply. In the remainder of the
article, we denote ("
N
w )it
1+("Nw )it
by it. From Eq. (20), it follows that the degree of monopsony power,
measured by (RN )itwit , depends negatively on ("
N
w )it. The more inelastic the labor supply curve
to the individual rm, the wider the gap between the marginal revenue of labor and the wage.
In the tradition of Pigou (1924) and Hicks (1932), this wedge

(RN )it wit
wit
= 1
("Nw )it

is referred
to in the literature as the rate of exploitation. Rewriting Eq. (20) gives the following expression
for the elasticity of output with respect to labor:
("QN )it = it (N )it

1 +
1
("Nw )it

(21)
Assuming again that the elasticity of scale, it = ("
Q
N )it+ ("
Q
M )it+ ("
Q
K)it, is known, estimation
of the production function
h
qit   kit = ("QN )it [nit   kit] + ("QM )it [mit   kit] + [it   1] kit + it
i
allows the identication of (1) the mark-up of price over marginal cost and (2) the labor supply
elasticity of the rm. Indeed, in a monopsony labor market, the parameter of joint market
imperfections ( it) is expressed as:
 it =
("QM )it
(M )it
  ("
Q
N )it
(N )it
=  it
1
("Nw )it
(22)
2.3 Econometric identication and estimation
The data features that are key to empirical identication of the product and labor market
imperfection parameters are the di¤erences between the estimated output elasticities of labor
and materials and their revenue shares. Depending on the labor market setting, it follows from
the parameter of joint market imperfections that these di¤erences can be mapped into either the
rm price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing [Eq. (18)] or the rm price-cost mark-up
and the rm labor supply elasticity [Eq. (22)].
Since our study aims at assessing industry and within-industry (or more precisely within-regime)
rm di¤erences in product and labor market imperfection parameters, we estimate average
parameters. There are many sources of variation in input shares. Some of them are related
to variation in hours of work, machinery, capacity utilization (variation in the business cycle).
When deriving our parameters of interest, we want to abstract from such sources of variation.
Therefore, we assume average input shares. More precisely, we derive average product and
labor market imperfection parameters by comparing the estimated average production function
coe¢ cients, i.e. the estimated average output elasticities of labor and materials, with their
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average input shares. The empirical specication that acts as the bedrock for the regressions in
this article is hence given by:
qit   kit = "QN [nit   kit] + "QM [mit   kit] + [  1] kit + it (23)
The estimated joint market imperfections parameter
b  determines the regime characterizing
the type of competition prevailing in the product and the labor market. A priori, 6 distinct
regimes are possible: (1) perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition
or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market, (2) imperfect competition in the product
market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market, (3) perfect
competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market, (4) perfect com-
petition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market, (5) imperfect competition in
the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market and (6) imperfect competition
in the product market and monopsony in the labor market. In the remaining of the article,
we denote the 6 possible regimes by R 2 < = fPC-PR; IC-PR;PC-EB;PC-MO; IC-EB; IC-
MOg, where the rst part reects the type of competition in the product market and the second
part reects the type of competition in the labor market. Once the regime is determined, we
derive the product and labor market imperfection parameters from the estimated joint market
imperfections parameter.
Our study considers product and labor market imperfections as two major sources of discrepan-
cies between the output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue shares. However,
we are well aware of the fact that there are other forces that are not included in our model-
ing frameworkwhich might impact our estimated elasticity-revenue share ratios. Possibilities
range from economic factors like distortions in the intermediate materials market, variable factor
utilization and factor adjustment costs to measurement issues. We consider adressing/testing
empirically these possible sources of discrepancies as a worthy subject for future research but
beyond the scope of this article.
3 Data description and manufacturing-level results
In this section, we discuss the data. For illustrative purposes, we also present the results of
estimating the production function at the manufacturing level.
3.1 Data description
We use an unbalanced panel of French manufacturing rms over the period 1978-2001, based
mainly on rm accounting information from EAE (Enquête Annuelle dEntreprise, Service
des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles(SESSI)). We only keep rms for which we have at least
12 years of observations, ending up with an unbalanced panel of 10646 rms with the number of
observations for each rm varying between 12 and 24.6 We use real current production deated
by the two-digit producer price index of the French industrial classication as a proxy for out-
put (Q). Labor (N) refers to the average number of employees in each rm for each year and
material input (M) refers to intermediate consumption deated by the two-digit intermediate
consumption price index. The capital stock (K) is measured by the gross bookvalue of xed
6Putting the number of rms between brackets and the number of observations between square brackets, the
structure of the data is given by: (1398) [12], (1369) [13], (1403) [14], (1315) [15], (3414) [16], (226) [17], (215)
[18], (200) [19], (164) [20], (153) [21], (180) [22], (136) [23], (473) [24]. The average number of observations per
rm is 15.5 and the total number of observations is 165009.
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assets.7 The shares of labor (N ) and material input (M ) are constructed by dividing respec-
tively the rm total labor cost and undeated intermediate consumption by the rm undeated
production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years. Table 1 reports the
means, standard deviations and quartile values of our main variables. The average growth rate
of real rm output for the overall sample is 2.1% per year over the period 1978-2001. Capital has
decreased at an average annual growth rate of 0.1%, while materials and labor have increased
at an average annual growth rate of 4% and 0.6% respectively. The Solow residual or the con-
ventional measure of total factor productivity (TFP ) is stable over the period. As expected for
rm-level data, the dispersion of all these variables is considerably large. For example, TFP
growth is lower than -5.6% for the rst quartile of rms and higher than 5.4% for the upper
quartile.
Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables 1978-2001
Mean Sd. Q1 Q2 Q3
Real rm output growth rate q 0.021 0.152 -0.061 0.019 0.103
Labor growth rate n 0.006 0.123 -0.043 0.000 0.054
Capital growth rate k -0.001 0.151 -0.072 -0.020 0.060
Materials growth rate m 0.040 0.192 -0.060 0.038 0.139
Labor share in nominal output N 0.307 0.136 0.208 0.291 0.387
Materials share in nominal output M 0.503 0.159 0.399 0.510 0.614
1  N   M 0.185 0.143 0.092 0.158 0.248
q  k 0.022 0.188 -0.081 0.024 0.126
n k 0.007 0.166 -0.073 0.014 0.088
m k 0.041 0.220 -0.079 0.041 0.160
SRa 0.000 0.100 -0.056 0.000 0.054
Number of observations: 154363, except for N and M (165009).
aSR = q   Nn  Mm  (1  N M )k.
3.2 Manufacturing-level results
For illustrative purposes, we estimate the standard production function [Eq. (23)] at the manu-
facturing level over the period 1978-2001 with and without imposing constant returns to scale.
Part 1 of Table 2 shows the results of estimating Eq. (23) under the assumption of constant
returns to scale ( = 1), while Part 2 allows for non constant returns to scale. We present both
set of results for a range of estimators. Columns 1 and 2 report the levels OLS results and
the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimates, respectively. From column 3 onwards, we take into account
endogeneity problems. Columns 3 and 5 display the results of estimating the model in rst
di¤erences to eliminate unobserved rm-specic e¤ects and using appropriate lags of internal
variables in levels (n, m and k) as instruments for the di¤erenced regressors to correct for
7The capital stock measure used in this article is the gross book value of tangible assets as reported in
the rm balance sheets at the beginning of the year (or the end of the previous year), adjusted for ination.
This is a standard measure in microeconometric studies of the production function based on rm accounting
information. It has the advantage of relying on direct information provided by the rm and does not make the
strong assumptions underlying the capital stock measures obtained by the perpetual inventory method, mainly
a constant rate of depreciation or a xed service life. In practice, however, panel data estimates of capital
elasticities appear to be very robust to the use of the two types of measures. See for example Atkinson and
Mairesse (1978) and Mairesse and Pescheux (1980).
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simultaneity (standard panel rst-di¤erenced GMM). As argued by, for example, Blundell and
Bond (2000), the rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator might be subject to large nite sample biases
due to the time series persistence properties of some of the variables. In columns 4 and 6, we
therefore adopt a more e¢ cient GMM estimator which includes level moments (system GMM).8
The last two columns report the results of estimating a dynamic specication of Eq. (23),
allowing for an autoregressive component in the productivity shock.9
The rst section of each part of Table 2 gives the estimated output elasticities. The second
section presents our key parameters which are derived from the average production function
coe¢ cient estimates: the estimated joint market imperfections parameter
b  from which we
infer that the IC-EB-regime applies at the manufacturing level, and the corresponding estimates
of the average price-cost mark-up (b) and the average extent of rent sharing b. The standard
errors () of b and b are computed using the Delta method (Woolridge, 2002).10 We also report
the prot ratio parameter, which can be expressed as the estimated price-cost mark-up divided
by the estimated scale elasticity
 bb. This ratio shows that the source of prot lies either in
imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale. As a benchmark, we present the average
price-cost mark-up that would apply if rms were to consider input prices as given prior to
deciding their level of inputs as in the original Hall (1988) setting (b only).
Focusing on our preferred estimator, the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimator under the assumption of
constant returns to scale, "QN , "
Q
M and "
Q
K are estimated at 0.298, 0.587 and 0.115 respectively.
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The joint market imperfections parameter estimate is 0.186. The derived price-cost mark-
up is found to be 1.167 and the corresponding extent of rent sharing 0.440. Ignoring e¢ cient
bargaining in the labor market brings the price-cost mark-up estimate down to 1.112. Intuitively,
this underestimation corresponds to the omission of the part of product rents captured by the
workers. Note that for all the GMM results, none of the specication tests is passed.12 Since,
contrary to this nding, the specication tests are passed nearly everywhere in the estimates at
the industry level (see infra), we conclude that the rejection of the tests at the manufacturing
level is due to imposing common slopes for the industries. Apart from being interested in
industry di¤erences per se, this nding motivates our analysis at the industry level. Note that
in the dynamic specication results, the test of common factor restrictions is never passed.13
8The GMM estimation is carried out in Stata 9.2 (Roodman, 2005). We report results for the one -step
estimator for which inference based on the asymptotic variance matrix is shown to be more reliable than for the
asymptotically more e¢ cient two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
9The productivity term is modeled as: it = i + ut + it, with it = it 1 + eit where jj < 1, and
eit MA(0). i is an unobserved rm-specic e¤ect, ut a year-specic intercept and it is an AR(1) error term.
10More specically, b and b are derived as follows: b = b"QM
M
;
b
1 b = b = b"QN  
b"Q
M
N
M

b"Q
M
M
(N+M 1)
and b = b
1+b . Their respective standard errors are computed as:  b2 = 1(M )2

b"Q
M
2
;
 
b2 =  MN+M 12
b"Q
M
2 
b"Q
N
!2
 2b"Q
N
b"Q
M
 
b"Q
N
;b"Q
M
!
+
b"Q
N
2 
b"Q
M
!2
b"Q
M
4 and b2 = (b)2(1+b)4 .
11We prefer the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimator under the assumption of constant returns to scale as this
estimator allows a consistent comparison of our results at the manufacturing, the industry and the rm level.
Since the number of observations for each rm varies between 12 and 24, taking into account endogeneity problems
in the rm estimations would lead to too much imprecision.
12Results not reported but available upon request. The validity of the instruments in the rst-di¤erenced
equations is rejected by the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions but the Di¤erence Sargan test does not
reject the validity of the additional instruments in di¤erences in the levels equations.
13Using it = i+ut+it, with it = it 1+eit and eit MA(0), and assuming constant returns to scale
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Comparing the results allowing for non constant returns to scale (Part 2 of Table 2) with those
imposing constant returns to scale (Part 1 of Table 2) leads to the following insights. The
returns to scale assumption evidently a¤ects the estimated output elasticities of factor inputs.
In general, the production function coe¢ cients are estimated to be lower when allowing for
non constant returns to scale. However, our product and labor market imperfection parameter
estimates
b and b appear to be relatively stable when allowing for non constant returns to
scale.14 Due to the nding of decreasing returns to scale, the average prot ratio parameter is
estimated to be higher when allowing for non constant returns to scale. Besides our objective to
compare consistently estimates of product and labor market imperfections at the manufacturing,
the industry and the rm level, we put forward a twofold motivation to maintain the constant
returns to scale assumption in the remainder of the article. First, since the rst-order conditions
with respect to the variable input factors Eq. (15) for labor and Eq. (7) for materialsdo not
depend on the returns to scale assumption, our key parameters are robust to this assumption.
Second, there is a problem of estimating simultaneously and precisely the price-cost mark-up
and the elasticity of scale parameters (see Crépon et al., 2005).
By way of sensitivity test, we restricted the total sample to those rms for which we have 24
years of observations and estimated Eq. (23) imposing constant returns to scale. On average,
the price-cost mark-up parameters are estimated to be higher and the corresponding extent of
rent-sharing parameters are estimated to be lower than those of the total (unbalanced) sample
across the di¤erent estimators.15
4 Industry analysis
From Section 2, it follows that the joint market imperfections parameter captures (im)perfect
competition in both the product and the labor market and as such determines the prevalent
regime. In this section, we rst classify our 38 manufacturing industries in distinct product and
labor market regimes. Once the regime is determined, we derive the average industry-specic
product and labor market imperfection parameters from the estimated average industry-specic
joint market imperfections parameter. Within the predominant regimes, we then provide a
detailed analysis of industry di¤erences in the estimated average parameters of interest, i.e. the
output elasticities of the production function, the joint market imperfections parameter, and
depending on the regimethe price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing or the labor
supply elasticity parameters.
( = 1), we can transform Eq. (23) through substitution to obtain qit kit = 1(qit 1 kit 1)+2(nit kit)+
3(nit 1   kit 1) + 4(mit   kit) + 5(mit 1   kit 1) + i + ut + eit, where 1 = , 2 = "QN , 3 =   "QN ,
4 = "
Q
M , 5 =   "QM , i = (1  ) i and ut = ut    ut 1. Given consistent estimates of the unrestricted
parameter vector  = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), the two non-linear common factor restrictions 3 =  1 2 and
5 =  1 4 can be tested using minimum distance to get the restricted parameter vector

"QN , "
Q
M , 

.
14Except for the estimated price-cost mark-up (b) using the rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator, which is esti-
mated to be much lower when allowing for non constant returns to scale (see Part 2 of Table 2). This result is
due to the considerable decrease in the estimated output elasticity of materials
b"QM when abstaining from the
constant returns to scale assumption.
15More specically, the price-cost mark-up is estimated at 1.319 (OLS LEV), 1.197 (OLS DIF), 1.357 (GMM
DIF) and 1.359 (GMM SYS). The extent of rent sharing is estimated at 0.345 (OLS LEV), 0.182 (OLS DIF),
0.481 (GMM DIF) and 0.374 (GMM SYS). In contrast to the total sample results, the Sargan test does not reject
the joint validity of the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t 2) and earlier as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced
equations. However, the validity of the additional rst-di¤erenced variables as instruments in the levels equations
is rejected by the Di¤erence Sargan test. Results not reported but available upon request.
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Table 2
Estimates of output elasticities b"QJ (J = N;M;K), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
price-cost mark-up b (only) and extent of rent sharing b :
Full sample: 10646 rms, each rm between 12 and 24 years of observations - period 1978-2001
Part 1: Imposing constant returns to scale: b"QK = 1  b"QN   b"QM
STATIC SPECIFICATION DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t  2)(t  3)
GMM SYS
(t  2)(t  3)
GMM DIF
(t  2)(t  3)
GMM SYS
(t  2)(t  3)b"QN 0.331(0.003) 0.298(0.003) 0.138(0.020) 0.298(0.008) 0.134(0.032) 0.201(0.015)b"QM 0.592(0.003) 0.587(0.003) 0.726(0.017) 0.675(0.007) 0.595(0.022) 0.541(0.019)b"QK 0.077 0.115 0.137 0.027 0.271 0.258
 1 1 1 1 1 1
b only = b only 1.144(0.003) 1.112(0.002) 1.129(0.013) 1.211(0.007) 1.041(0.032) 0.934(0.020)b 0.096
(0.017)
0.186
(0.013)
0.993
(0.095)
0.370
(0.036)
0.745
(0.128)
0.421
(0.071)b = b 1.177(0.007) 1.167(0.005) 1.443(0.033) 1.342(0.015) 1.184(0.043) 1.076(0.039)b 0.647
(0.017)
0.785
(0.013)
1.628
(0.063)
0.962
(0.030)
1.532
(0.116)
1.146
(0.069)b 0.393
(0.006)
0.440
(0.004)
0.619
(0.009)
0.490
(0.008)
0.605
(0.018)
0.534
(0.015)b 0.713
(0.023)
0.619
(0.018)
Part 2: Not imposing constant returns to scale: b"QK = b  b"QN   b"QM
STATIC SPECIFICATION DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t  2)(t  3)
GMM SYS
(t  2)(t  3)
GMM DIF
(t  2)(t  3)
GMM SYS
(t  2)(t  3)b"QN 0.331(0.001) 0.189(0.002) 0.149(0.022) 0.240(0.011) 0.111(0.031) 0.057(0.025)b"QM 0.592(0.001) 0.554(0.002) 0.566(0.020) 0.696(0.008) 0.554(0.023) 0.562(0.020)b"QK 0.077(0.002) 0.049(0.003) -0.027(0.038) 0.033(0.017) 0.033(0.057) 0.241(0.027)b 1
(0.0006)
0.792
(0.003)
0.688
(0.020)
0.969
(0.004)
0.803
(0.052)
0.860
(0.025)
b only 1.153
(0.004)
1.011
(0.004)
0.890
(0.022)
1.219
(0.008)
1.011
(0.035)
0.916
(0.033)
b onlyb 1.145(0.003) 1.189(0.003) 1.398(0.035) 1.212(0.007) 1.074(0.054) 0.897(0.022)b 0.100
(0.019)
0.488
(0.012)
0.639
(0.101)
0.602
(0.047)
0.729
(0.128)
0.582
(0.077)b 1.177
(0.002)
1.102
(0.004)
1.126
(0.039)
1.383
(0.016)
1.100
(0.046)
1.117
(0.041)b 0.652
(0.006)
1.231
(0.010)
1.433
(0.091)
1.219
(0.037)
1.598
(0.118)
1.864
(0.091)b 0.395
(0.002)
0.552
(0.002)
0.589
(0.015)
0.549
(0.007)
0.615
(0.017)
0.651
(0.011)
bb 1.178(0.002) 1.392(0.006) 1.637(0.055) 1.427(0.020) 1.371(0.088) 1.299(0.057)b 0.723
(0.023)
0.609
(0.020)
Robust standard errors and rst-step robust standard errors in columns 1-2 and columns 3-6 respectively.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
(1) Input shares: N = 0:307, M = 0:503, K = 0:190.
(2) GMM DIF : the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t  2) and (t  3).
(3) GMM SY S: the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t  2) and (t  3) in the rst-di¤erenced
equations and correspondingly the lagged rst-di¤erences of n, m and k dated (t  1) in the levels equations.
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To assess the plausibility of the estimated industry-specic product and labor market imperfec-
tion parameters, we tie these estimates to industry-specic observables (protability, unioniza-
tion, import penetration and technology intensity) within the dominant regime.
4.1 Classication of industries
We consider 38 manufacturing industries, which are based on the French industrial classication
(Nomenclature économique de synthèse - Niveau 3[NES 114]), making up our sample. This
decomposition is detailed enough for our purposes and ensures that each industry contains a
su¢ cient number of rms (minimum: 104 rms, maximum: 1000 rms). Table 3 presents the
industry repartition of the sample and the number of rms and the number of observations for
each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 38g.
We apply the following classication procedure on which we comment below.
Classication procedure:
Hypothesis test
Statistical
signicance level
Null hypothesis
not rejected
PART 1: F -test of the joint hypothesis (explicit joint test):
H0:

j 1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
 1

=

 j=
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

= 0
10% R = PC-PR
PART 2: Two separate t-tests (implicit joint test):
H10:

j 1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
 1

> 0 and
H20:

 j=
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

= 0
10%
10%
R = IC-PR
H10:

j 1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
 1

= 0 and
H20:

 j=
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

> 0
10%
10%
R = PC-EB
H10:

j 1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
 1

= 0 and
H20:

 j=
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

< 0
10%
10%
R = PC-MO
H10:

j 1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
 1

> 0 and
H20:

 j=
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

< 0
10%
10%
R = IC-MO
H10:

j 1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
 1

> 0 and
H20:

 j=
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

> 0
10%
10%
R = IC-EB
For each industry j, we estimate the production function assuming constant returns to scale
[Eq. (23) with  = 1] using the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimator. In the rst part of the classica-
tion procedure, we perform an F -test (explicit joint test) of the joint hypothesis H0 :
 
j   1

=
 j = 0, where the alternative is that at least one of the parameters (the industry-specic price-
cost mark-up j minus 1 or the industry-specic joint market imperfections parameter  j) does
not equal zero. In other words, if H0 is not rejected, that particular industry is character-
ized by perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage
bargaining in the labor market. If H0 is rejected, the prevalent regime R 2 <nfPC-PRg.
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Having selected the industries typied by the PC-PR-regime, we test a 2-dimensional hypothesis
by conducting two separate t-tests to classify the remaining industries in one of the 5 other
regimes in the second part of the classication procedure. For example, if our null hypothesis is
that imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market
feature the industry, we perform the following implicit joint test (or induced test) (Savin, 1984):
H10 :
 
j   1

> 0 and H20 :  j > 0. The separate t-tests reject that the IC-EB-regime applies
if either H10 or H20 is rejected.
Since we believe that it is more likely that an industry is characterized by imperfections in either
the product market or the labor market, we put a priori less weight on the PC-PR-regime by
using the 10% statistical signicance level instead of the conventional 5% level. More specically,
when testing H0 :
 
j   1

=  j = 0 in the rst part of the classication procedure, we reject
H0 at the 10% level if the two-tailed p-value is less than 0.10. When testing H10 :
 
j   1

= 0
against H1a :
 
j   1

> 0 in the second part of the classication procedure, we reject H10 at
the 10% level if
 
j   1

> 0 and the two-tailed p-value is less than 0.20. Likewise, for the
two-tailed test of  j , we reject H20 :  j = 0 at the 10% level if the two-tailed p-value is less
than 0.10. We conducted two robustness checks which we discuss below.
In such classication procedure, there might be a potential for a conict between the explicit
joint test in the rst part and the implicit joint test in the second part since the rejection regions
for both tests di¤er. W do not nd any inconsistencies, except for 1 industry (see infra).
We performed two robustness checks. First, we investigated how robust the industry classica-
tion is to imposing the constraint

j =
(QM)j
(M )j

 1. As discussed in Section 2.3, this article
focuses on di¤erences in product and labor market imperfection parameters and hence estimates
average parameters. One could argue, however, that it is not reasonable to assume that on
averageprices fall below marginal costs over a period of 24 years. Therefore, we estimated
the following non-linear specication for each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 38g using the rst-di¤erenced
OLS estimator:
SRit = qit   Nnit   Mmit   [1  N   M ] kit (24)
=
"
"QM
M
  1
#2
[N [nit   kit] + M [mit   kit]] 
"
"QM
M
  "
Q
N
N
#
[N [nit   kit]] + it
Second, we tested the sensitivity of the industry classication by increasing the rejection regions
in both parts of the classication procedure. In the rst part of the procedure, H0 :
 
j   1

=
 j = 0 is rejected if
 
j   1;  j

falls outside an elliptical probability contour. To check robust-
ness, we rejected H0 at the 40% level instead of at the 10% level. Likewise, we increased the
rejection region in the second part of the procedure by decreasing the critical values of the two
separate test statistics, corresponding to the 40% statistical signicance level.
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Table 3
Industry repartition
Industry j Code Name
# Firms
(# Obs.)
Regime R
1 B01 Meat preparations 324 (4881) IC-MO
2 B02 Milk products 122 (1981) PC-MO?
3 B03 Beverages 106 (1705) PC-MO?
4 B04 Food production for animals 126 (1942) PC-MO?
5 B05-B06 Other food products 518 (7835) IC-EB
6 C11 Clothing and skin goods 453 (6938) IC-EB
7 C12 Leather goods and footwear 213 (3400) IC-EB
8 C20 Publishing, (re)printing 724 (10919) IC-EB
9 C31 Pharmaceutical products 130 (2153) PC-MO?
10 C32 Soap, perfume and maintenance products 114 (1877) PC-MO
11 C41 Furniture 322 (5043) IC-EB
12 C42, C44-C46 Accommodation equipment 179 (2871) IC-PRO
13 C43 Sport articles, games and other products 156 (2390) IC-PRO
14 D01 Motor vehicles 133 (2064) IC-PR
15 D02 Transport equipment 129 (2177) IC-PRO
16 E11-E14 Ship building, aircraft and railway construction 110 (1834) IC-PR
17 E21 Metal products for construction 171 (2590) IC-EB
18 E22 Ferruginous and steam boilers 294 (4461) IC-EB
19 E23 Mechanical equipment 182 (3020) PC-MO?;O
20 E24 Machinery for general usage 268 (4151) IC-PR
21 E25-E26 Agriculture machinery 154 (2391) PC-PRO
22 E27-E28 Other machinery for specic usage 286 (4355) IC-EB
23 E31-E35 Electric and electronic machinery 203 (2934) IC-EB
24 F11-F12 Mineral products 205 (3099) IC-EB
25 F13 Glass products 104 (1681) PC-MOO
26 F14 Earthenware products and construction material 391 (6109) IC-EB
27 F21 Textile art 270 (4338) IC-EB
28 F22-F23 Textile products and clothing 310 (4858) IC-EB
29 F31 Wooden products 475 (7170) IC-PRO
30 F32-F33 Paper and printing products 330 (5312) IC-PR
31 F41-F42 Mineral and organic chemical products 192 (3026) IC-MO
32 F43-F45 Parachemical and rubber products 171 (2759) PC-MO?
33 F46 Transformation of plastic products 600 (9037) IC-EB
34 F51-F52 Steel products, non-ferrous metals 125 (2024) IC-PRO
35 F53 Ironware 138 (2247) IC-EB
36 F54 Industrial service to metal products 1000 (14930) IC-EB
37 F55-F56 Metal products, recuperation 599 (9314) IC-EB
38 F61-F62 Electrical goods and components 319 (5193) IC-PR
?Imposing

j=
(QM)j
(M )j

 1 and estimating a non-lineair specication switches industry j = 2; 3; 4; 9; 19 and 32
from PC-MO to IC-MO.
OIncreasing the rejection region in both parts of the classication procedure by using the 40% statistical signicance level,
switches industry j = 21 from PC-PR to PC-MO, industry j = 19 and 25 from PC-MO to IC-MO,
industry j = 12; 13 and 15 from IC-PR to IC-EB and industry j = 29 and 34 from IC-PR to IC-MO.
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Table 4 summarizes the industry classication. For details on the specic industries belonging to
each regime, we refer to column 5 of Table 3. Focusing on the main classication, it follows that
the dominant regime is IC-EB, 17 out of the 38 industries (45%) belong to this regime. This
is consistent with the nding that manufacturing as a whole is characterized by IC-EB. The
second predominant regime is IC-PR, 10 out of the 38 industries (26%) belong to this regime.
The third predominant regime is PC-MO, 8 out of the 38 industries (21%) belong to this regime.
The IC-MO-regime only holds for 2 out of the 38 industries (5%). Only 1 industry (3%) belongs
to the PC-PR-regime. Note that initially, we rejected the PC-PR-regime for that particular
industry (industry j = 21) due to a type I error in the rst part of the classication procedure.
Based on the two separate t-tests, however, we decided to classify this industry in the PC-PR-
regime.16 As expected, none of the industries is characterized by perfect competition in the
product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (PC-EB). On the product market
side, 76% of the industries are typied by imperfect competition. On the labor market side, 45%
of the industries are characterized by e¢ cient bargaining, 26% of the industries by monopsony
and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining features 29% of the industries.
Focusing on the rst robustness check, six industries switch from PC-MO to IC-MO. These
industries are indicated by
 ?
in column 5 of Table 3. As a result, the proportion of industries
characterized by imperfect competition in the product market increases from 76% to 92%.
Evidently, the classication of industries in one of the three labor market settings is not a¤ected.
Focusing on the second robustness check, eight industries switch from one regime to another.
These industries are indicated by (O) in column 5 of Table 3. Consequently, 82% of the industries
are typied by imperfect competition on the product market side. On the labor market side, 53%
of the industries are characterized by e¢ cient bargaining, 34% of the industries by monopsony
and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining features 13% of the industries.
16Note that H20 :  j = 0 is not rejected at the borderline (p-value of 0.13).
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Table 4
Classication of industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 38g in
regime R 2 < = fPC-PR; IC-PR;PC-EB;PC-MO; IC-EB; IC-MOg
MAIN CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE
# ind.
prop. of ind. (%)
LABOR MARKET
PRODUCT MARKET
Perfect competition
or right-to-manage
bargaining (PR)
E¢ cient
bargaining (EB)
Monopsony (MO)
Perfect competition (PC)
1
2:6%
0
0%
8
21:1%
9
23:7%
Imperfect competition (IC)
10
26:3%
17
44:7%
2
5:3%
29
76:3%
11
29%
17
44:7%
10
26:3%
38
100%
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 1
# ind.
prop. of ind. (%)
LABOR MARKET
PRODUCT MARKET
Perfect competition
or right-to-manage
bargaining (PR)
E¢ cient
bargaining (EB)
Monopsony (MO)
Perfect competition (PC)
1
2:6%
0
0%
2
5:3%
3
7:9%
Imperfect competition (IC)
10
26:3%
17
44:7%
8
21:1%
35
92:1%
11
29%
17
44:7%
10
26:3%
38
100%
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 2
# ind.
prop. of ind. (%)
LABOR MARKET
PRODUCT MARKET
Perfect competition
or right-to-manage
bargaining (PR)
E¢ cient
bargaining (EB)
Monopsony (MO)
Perfect competition (PC)
0
0%
0
0%
7
18:4%
7
18:4%
Imperfect competition (IC)
5
13:2%
20
52:6%
6
15:8%
31
81:6%
5
13:2%
20
52:6%
13
34:2%
38
100%
For details on the specic industries belonging to each regime: see Table 3.
18
4.2 Industry-level estimates of product and labor market imperfec-
tions
The predominant regimes are IC-EB (17 industries), IC-PR (10 industries) and PC-MO (8
industries). Within each of these regimes, we investigate industry di¤erences in the computed
industry-specic factor shares (J)j (J = N;M;K), the estimated industry-specic output
elasticities
b"QJ 
j
(J = N;M;K), joint market imperfections parameter b j , and corresponding
price-cost mark-up bj (only) and extent of rent sharing bj or labor supply elasticity b"Nw 
j
.
Table 5 presents the industry mean and the industry quartile values of the rst-di¤erenced
OLS results within the predominant regimes. The system GMM results are reported in Table
A.1 in Appendix. For reasons of comparability, we use the same classication of industries
within regimes (see main classication in Table 4) for both estimators. All the industry-specic
estimates (OLS DIF and GMM SYS) are presented in Table A.2 in Appendix.17 Tables 5, A.1
and A.2 have the same format: the left part reports the computed factor shares, the middle
part reports the output elasticity estimates and the right part reports the estimated price-cost
mark-up that would apply if rms were to consider input prices as given prior to deciding their
level of inputs, the estimated joint market imperfections parameter and the derived product
and labor market imperfections parameters, i.e. the price-cost mark-up taking into account
labor market imperfections and the extent of rent sharing for industries within IC-EB, and
the price-cost mark-up taking into account labor market imperfections and the labor supply
elasticity for industries within PC-MO and IC-MO.18 In Table A.2, the industries within the
IC-EB-regime are ranked according to bj . Within the IC-PR-regime, the table is drawn up in
increasing order of bj . Within the PC-MO-regime and the IC-MO-regime, we rank industries
in order of increasing bj = (b"Nw )j1+(b"Nw )j .
From Table 5, it follows that industry di¤erences in the estimated market imperfection para-
meters and in the underlying estimated factor elasticities and shares are quite sizable, as could
be expected. Let us focus the discussion on the primary parameters within the predominant
regimes.
 Within regime R = IC-EB, b j is lower than 0.191 for industries in the rst quartile and
higher than 0.426 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding bj is lower than
1.162 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.235 for the top quartile. The
corresponding bj is lower than 0.264 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than
0.398 for the top quartile. The median values of bj and bj are estimated at 1.188 and
0.363 respectively. Ignoring the occurrence of rent sharing reduces the estimated median
price-cost mark-up to 1.099
 bj only.
17For reasons of completeness, Table A.2 also provides detailed information on the rst-di¤erenced OLS and
the system GMM estimates of the industries which are classied in the IC-MO-regime (2 industries) and the
PC-PR-regime (1 industry).
18Dropping subscript j, b and b"Nw are derived as follows: b = b"Nw1+b"Nw = NM b"QMb"QN and b"Nw =b
1 b . Their respective standard errors are computed using the Delta method as follows:

b
2
=

N
M
2 b"QM2 b"Q
N
!2
 2b"Q
N
b"Q
M
 
b"Q
N
;b"Q
M
!
+
b"Q
N
2 
b"Q
M
!2
b"Q
N
4 and b"Nw 2 =

b
2
(1 b)4 . For the derivation of the
market imperfection parameters b, b and b, and their respective standard errors, we refer to footnote 10.
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 Within regime R = IC-PR, b is lower than 1.081 for industries in the rst quartile and
higher than 1.163 for industries in the upper quartile. The median value is estimated at
1.123.
 Within R = PC-MO, we observe the highest dispersion in b j compared to the two other
predominant regimes. This parameter is estimated to be lower than -0.701 for industries in
the rst quartile and higher than -0.342 for industries in the third quartile. Consequently,
industry di¤erences in
b"Nw 
j
are also large. This elasticity is estimated to be lower than
1.408 for industries in the rst quartile and higher than 2.973 for industries in the upper
quartile. The median value of
b"Nw 
j
is estimated at 1.711.
Taking into account endogeneity problems reveals the following patterns in the estimates (see
Table A.1 in Appendix). Compared to the rst-di¤erenced OLS results, we observe a comparable
degree of dispersion in the estimated joint market imperfections parameter across the three
predominant regimes. However, across these three regimes we clearly discern an increase in this
parameter estimate. Resolving the simultaneity bias, this increase translates into a considerably
higher price-cost mark-up estimate across the three regimes, as expected.
 Within IC-EB, the estimate of the extent of rent sharing remains unchanged. The median
values of bj and bj are estimated at 1.296 and 0.335 respectively (compared to 1.188 and
0.363 using the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimator).
 Within IC-PR, the median value of bj increases from 1.123 (OLS DIF) to 1.260.
 Within PC-MO, the increase in b j translates into a higher estimate of bj = (b"Nw )j1+(b"Nw )j
as well. The median value of bj increases from 0.984 to 1.132 and the median value
of bj increases from 0.629 to 0.883. Besides an increase in both market imperfection
parameters, we also observe a higher degree of dispersion in both parameters. The value
of the interquartile range of bj increases from 0.055 to 0.082. For bj , we identify an
increase from 0.164 to 0.230.
How do our estimates of product and labor market imperfections match up with other studies?
Imposing IC-EB on the data, Dobbelaere (2004) and Boulhol et al. (2010) examine industry
di¤erences in price-cost mark-ups and extent of rent sharing. Using a panel of 7086 Belgian
rms in 18 manufacturing industries over the period 1988-1995, Dobbelaere (2004) nds that
the price-cost mark-up is lower than 1.354 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than
1.500 for the upper quartile. The corresponding extent of rent sharing is lower than 0.161 for
the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.263 for the third quartile. Using a panel of
11799 British rms in 20 manufacturing industries, Boulhol et al. (2010) estimate the price-cost
mark-up to be lower than 1.212 for the bottom quartile of industries and higher than 1.292 for
the top quartile. The corresponding extent of rent sharing is estimated to be lower than 0.189
for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.544 for the upper quartile. Whereas there
is an abundant literature on estimating the extent of product market power (see Bresnahan,
1989 for a survey), there is little direct evidence of employer market power over its workers. For
studies estimating the wage elasticity of the labor supply curve facing an individual employer,
we refer to Reynolds (1946), Nelson (1973), Sullivan (1989), Boal (1995), Staiger et al. (1999),
Falch (2001) and Manning (2003). These studies point to an elasticity in the [1-5]-range.19
19For example, employing regional data, Nelson (1973) uses a population density measure to identify labor
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Table 5
Summary industry analysis: Industry-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

OLS DIF
Regime  = -
[17 industries]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b b
Industry mean 0.334 0.488 0.178 0.295 (0.012) 0.586 (0.010) 0.119 (0.010) 1.106 (0.012) 0.319 (0.053) 1.204 (0.022) 0.526 (0.079) 0.328 (0.036)
Industry 1 0.294 0.470 0.165 0.264 (0.010) 0.566 (0.008) 0.103 (0.008) 1.078 (0.011) 0.191 (0.040) 1.162 (0.019) 0.359 (0.054) 0.264 (0.029)
Industry 2 0.333 0.482 0.177 0.286 (0.012) 0.585 (0.011) 0.118 (0.010) 1.099 (0.012) 0.315 (0.054) 1.188 (0.022) 0.569 (0.073) 0.363 (0.033)
Industry 3 0.379 0.513 0.187 0.316 (0.015) 0.634 (0.012) 0.137 (0.013) 1.138 (0.014) 0.426 (0.065) 1.235 (0.024) 0.661 (0.093) 0.398 (0.036)
Regime  = -
[10 industries]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b
Industry mean 0.287 0.520 0.193 0.314 (0.017) 0.588 (0.014) 0.098 (0.013) 1.121 (0.015) 0.024 (0.080) 1.129 (0.027)
Industry 1 0.257 0.496 0.170 0.287 (0.013) 0.550 (0.012) 0.083 (0.010) 1.081 (0.011) -0.007 (0.065) 1.081 (0.022)
Industry 2 0.286 0.531 0.197 0.309 (0.017) 0.577 (0.014) 0.088 (0.013) 1.116 (0.015) 0.048 (0.077) 1.123 (0.028)
Industry 3 0.330 0.538 0.213 0.351 (0.020) 0.642 (0.017) 0.112 (0.017) 1.155 (0.019) 0.074 (0.085) 1.163 (0.031)
Regime  = -
[8 industries]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

Industry mean 0.223 0.565 0.211 0.328 (0.022) 0.557 (0.021) 0.115 (0.017) 1.074 (0.023) -0.556 (0.140) 0.987 (0.038) 0.659 (0.064) 2.574 (1.099)
Industry 1 0.160 0.508 0.195 0.264 (0.020) 0.515 (0.019) 0.098 (0.015) 1.053 (0.020) -0.701 (0.113) 0.960 (0.035) 0.584 (0.059) 1.408 (0.370)
Industry 2 0.231 0.548 0.212 0.338 (0.022) 0.536 (0.021) 0.111 (0.016) 1.065 (0.024) -0.563 (0.129) 0.984 (0.036) 0.629 (0.062) 1.711 (0.442)
Industry 3 0.281 0.630 0.234 0.383 (0.023) 0.603 (0.024) 0.126 (0.019) 1.101 (0.026) -0.342 (0.166) 1.015 (0.040) 0.748 (0.069) 2.973 (1.127)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 Detailed information on the industry-specific estimates is presented in Table A.2 [Part 1] in Appendix.
  =
()
( )
− (
)
( )
 =
()−

()
( )
( )

()
( )
[( )+( )−1]
 =
( )
1+( )
=
( )
( )
()
()
 =
()
( )
 =

1+




=

1−
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4.3 Di¤erent dimensions across industries within the IC-EB-regime
Having quantied industry di¤erences in product and labor market imperfection parameters in
the previous section, this section aims at assessing the plausibility of the industry estimates
within the dominant regime (IC-EB). To this end, we tie these estimates to industry observ-
ables. We classify the 17 industries according to protability, unionization, import penetration
and technology intensity. For the rst three dimensions, we consider three types (low, medium
and high). For the technology dimension, we consider two types (low and medium). Columns 4-7
in Table A.3 in Appendix indicate for each dimension the type to which each industry belongs.
Graphs 1-4 aim at discerning a pattern in the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimates of bj and bj within
IC-EB. Each graph corresponds to one of the four dimensions (protability, unionization,
import penetration and technology intensity). Within each dimension, di¤erent symbols refer to
di¤erent types (low, medium and high). The dashed lines denote the median values (bj;med =
1:188, bj;med = 0:363). Observing a positive correlation between bj and bj of 0.332, most
industries are situated either in the upper right part or the lower left part of the graphs.
As to the protability dimension, we calculate the average industry-specic price-cost margin
(PCM) and determine the di¤erent types based on the percentile values (low = [1-33]-percentiles,
medium = [34-66]-percentiles and high = [67-100]-percentiles).20 Following Bain (1941), many
analytical and empirical studies have provided evidence of a positive relationship between market
structure and performance (protability) (see Martin, 1993 for a survey). Therefore, we expect
a positive correlation between PCMs and price-cost mark-ups.
 Considering the low- and high-type industries (11 out of the 17 industries), the rank
correlation coe¢ cient is 0.47 (p-value of 0.14) for bj and -0.27 (p-value of 0.43) for bj .
 Graph 1 shows that for 4 out of the 6 most protable industries, bj > bj;med. For 4 out of
the 5 least protable industries, bj < bj;med. As to bj , no clear pattern can be detected.
To construct our measure of the degree of unionization, we merge our original dataset consisting
of rms from EAE (SESSI) with the REPONSE 1998 (Relations Professionnelles et Négocia-
tions dEntreprises) database collected by the French Ministry of Labor. Having 911 rms left,
we compute the average industry-specic union density.21 Similar to the protability dimension,
the percentile values dene the three types. According to the standard rent-sharing literature,
unions are most likely created in rms where rents can be extracted. Since this is most likely
to happen if there is imperfect competition in the product market, we expect a positive correla-
tion between union density and price-cost mark-ups. Union density is expected to be positively
related to the extent of rent sharing, as shown by Karier (1985) and Conyon and Machin (1991).
 Considering the low- and high-type industries (11 out of the 17 industries), the rank
correlation coe¢ cient is 0.26 (p-value of 0.43) for bj and 0.10 (p-value of 0.76) for bj .
supply and reports large elasticities for most US states. Sullivan (1989) estimates the supply elasticity of nurses
directed toward individual hospitals to be in the [1:3-3:8]-range. Using data from US coal mining, Boal (1995)
nds the labor supply elasticity to be in the [1:9-6:8]-range in the short run and innite in the long run. Staiger
et al. (1999) point to an elasticity estimate of around 0.10, implying considerable monopsonistic wage-setting
power.
20The price-cost margin is dened as the di¤erence between revenue and variable cost over revenue (see
Schmalensee, 1989, p. 960).
21Since we use a small non-representative subsample (only 911 rms) to dene the degree of industry-specic
unionization, the resulting classication has to be interpreted with caution.
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 Graph 2 shows that for 3 out of the 5 industries with a high degree of unionization,bj > bj;med. For 5 out of the 6 weakly unionized industries, bj < bj;med. For 3 out of the
6 weakly unionized industries, bj < bj;med.
As to the openness dimension, we compute the average industry-specic import penetration ratio
as the ratio of industry product imports to the sum of these imports plus the value of domestic
production in the industry using the input-output tables dened at the three-digit level (National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)). The di¤erent types are also identied
through the percentile values. Firms under intensifying pressure from foreign competition are
induced to reduce their price-cost margins because of the increase in the perceived elasticity of
the demand they are facing. Following Levinsohn (1993), many studies have shown evidence of
the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis (see Boulhol et al., 2010 for references). Following
Rodriks (1997) argument that the closer substitutes domestic and foreign workers are due to
e.g. international trade the lower the enterprise surplus ending up with workers, we expect
a negative correlation between import penetration and the extent of rent sharing (see also
Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006 and Dumont et al., 2006). Using Belgian and UK rm-level data
respectively, Abraham et al. (2009) and Boulhol et al. (2010) provide support for the imports-
as-product-and-labor-market discipline hypothesis, i.e. they provide evidence of international
competition curtailing domestic market power in the product market as well as in the labor
market.
 Considering the low- and high-type industries (10 out of the 17 industries), the rank
correlation coe¢ cient is -0.41 (p-value of 0.24) for bj and -0.22 (p-value of 0.54) for bj .
 Graph 3 shows that for 4 out of the 5 industries with high import penetration rates, bj <bj;med while for 3 out of the 5 industries shielded from import competition, bj > bj;med.
The identication of the two technology types relies on the OECD classication. This method-
ology uses two indicators of technology intensity, R&D expenditures divided by value added and
R&D expenditures divided by production (OECD, 2005). When competition intensies, rms
reaction is not limited to pricing behavior. Sutton (1991, 1998) insists on the endogeneity of
market structure. An increase in the competitive environment may trigger an endogenous reac-
tion of rms through an increase in R&D spending for instance. This might force out rms that
are unable to keep the pace. R&D expenditures could hence be positively related to mark-ups.
The correlation between technology intensity and rent sharing is a priori unclear. As discussed
in Betcherman (1991), it depends on the importance of labor costs in the rms total costs and
on the workerssubstitutability in the production process. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) follow the
same argument.
 The rank correlation coe¢ cient is -0.06 (p-value of 0.83) for bj and -0.29 (p-value of 0.25)
for bj .
 Graph 4 shows that for 5 out of the 8 medium-technology industries, bj < bj;med whereas
for 6 out of the 9 low-technology industries, bj > bj;med.
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Graph 1   Profitability differences across industries within R=IC-EB 
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Graph 2   Unionization differences across industries within R=IC-EB  
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Graph 3   Openness differences across industries within R=IC-EB 
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Graph 4   Technology differences across industries within R=IC-EB 
 
5 Firm analysis
Our rm analysis essentially aims at gaining insight into the production behavior of rms within
industries. Indeed, production behavior is likely to vary even within industries, because input
combinations di¤er, labor markets are not homogeneous and demand might be more elastic or
inelastic in one rm compared to another. Since production is primarily a¤ected by input factors
and only secondarily by for example demand conditions, we assume that the relationships
among variables are proper but that the production function coe¢ cients di¤er across rms.
Therefore, we estimate the production function assuming constant returns to scale [Eq. (23)
with  = 1] for each rm i using the rst-di¤erenced OLS estimator and retrieve our market
imperfection parameters from the estimated rm output elasticities
b"QJ 
i
(J = N;M;K)

.22
We only consider rms for which
b"QN
i
and
b"QM
i
are estimated to be positive, ending up with
9032 rms.23 To guarantee consistency between the industry analysis and the rm analysis,
we investigate rm di¤erences in product and labor market imperfections conditional on the
industry classication.
We start with a brief discussion of the Swamy (1970) methodology. We then apply this method-
ology to analyze whether there is real rm-level dispersion in the estimated average factor
elasticities and average shares, and the derived imperfection parameters within the three pre-
dominant regimes to which the industries belong (IC-EB; IC-PR and PC-MO). To assess the
plausibility of the estimated rm-level product and labor market imperfection parameters, we
tie these rm-level estimates to rm-specic observables within the dominant regime (IC-EB).
5.1 Swamy (1970) methodology
To determine the degree of true dispersion in the production function coe¢ cients and market
imperfection parameters, we adopt the Swamy (1970) methodology as a variance decomposition
approach.24 This method allows us to estimate the variance components in the estimated rm
output elasticities
b"QJ 
i
(J = N;M;K), the joint market imperfections parameter b i, and
the corresponding price-cost mark-up bi and extent of rent sharing bi or labor supply elasticityb"Nw 
i
. In particular, the Swamy methodology enables to disentangle the pure sampling variance
from the true variance.
Considering random production function coe¢ cients that vary across rms and assuming con-
stant returns to scale, we rewrite the production function as follows:25
qi = Xi"i + i (25)
22Besides allowing for di¤erences across rms, we could also focus on the stability of the parameters over
time. However, relaxing the constancy of the joint market imperfections parameter b i, and the corresponding
price-cost mark-up bi and extent of rent sharing bi or labor supply elasticity b"Nw 
i
in the time dimension would
overload our already overextended computational framework.
23Starting from the 10646 rm estimates, we nd that
b"QNi is estimated to be negative in 1481 rms andb"QMi is estimated to be negative in 136 rms. Only 32% of the negatively estimated b"QNi is statistically
signicant at the 20% level. Only 21% of the negatively estimated
b"QMi is statistically signicant at the 20%
level.
24For a more general treatment, we refer to Arellano and Bonhomme (2010).
25For the sake of parsimony, we denote the explanatory variables by Xi (letting x1it  1) and the rm output
elasticities by "i.
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"i is assumed to be randomly distributed with "i = e" + i. e" = (e"1, ..., e"K)0 represents the
common-mean coe¢ cient vector and i = (1i, ..., Ki)
0 the individual deviation from the com-
mon mean e". Following Swamy (1970), we assume that the errors for rm i are uncorre-
lated across rms and allow for heteroskedasticity across rms, i  N
 
0, 2i I

. E (i) = 0,
E
 
i
0
j

=  if i = j, E
 
i
0
j

= 0 otherwise. Swamy suggests rst estimating Eq. (25) for
each rm i by OLS giving:
b"i = (X0iXi) 1X0i qi (26)bi = qi  Xib"i (27)
Using Eqs. (26) and (27), we obtain unbiased estimators of 2i (b2i = b0ibiT K ) and [see Eq. (28)].
Indeed, dening the mean of b"i as " = 1N NP
i=1
b"i, their variance can be estimated as:
b = 1
N   1
NP
i=1
(b"i   ") (b"i   ")0   1
N
NP
i=1
V ar (b"i)
=
1
N   1
NP
i=1
(b"i   ") (b"i   ")0| {z }
(1)
  1
N
NP
i=1
b2i (X0iXi) 1| {z }
(2)
(28)
The logic behind the denition of b, the Swamy estimate of true variance of the coe¢ cients,
is that due to noisy estimates (b"i), much of the variation in b"i is not caused by real parameter
variability but purely by sampling error. Swamy (1970) suggests to correct for this sampling
variability by subtracting it o¤.
Two major advantages of the Swamy methodology are that these estimates are the most straight-
forward to obtain among the di¤erent estimators of coe¢ cient dispersion and that they are
robust to the possibility of correlated e¤ects between the rm intercept and slope parameters
and the other variables in the equation since they are based on individual regression estimates
(see Mairesse and Griliches, 1990).26
5.2 Firm heterogeneity in product and labor market imperfections
Do we observe sizeable heterogeneity in the production behavior of rms within regimes? To
gain insight into that issue, we focus on rm heterogeneity within the predominant regimes to
which the industries belong (IC-EB, IC-PR and PC-MO). We only consider rms for whichb"QN
i
and
b"QM
i
are estimated to be positive, ending up with 9032 rms. 8459 out of these
9032 rms belong to industries for which IC-EB, IC-PR or PC-MO holds.
Table 6 summarizes the rst-di¤erenced OLS results of estimating Eq. (25) for each rm i. The
rst part of Table 6 presents the estimates of rms belonging to industries for which regime
R = IC-EB holds (5715 rms). The second part presents the estimates of rms belonging
26Besides the Swamy methodology, the random coe¢ cient model literature suggests two other variance de-
composition approaches. One approach uses the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator and the other is a more
exible approach that amounts to regressing the squares and the cross-products of residuals on comparable
squares and cross-products of the independent variables (Hildreth and Houck, 1968; Amemiya, 1977; MaCurdy,
1985). Contrary to the Swamy estimates, the ML estimates and those based on the regression of the squares
and cross-products of the residuals assume either independence of the rm slope parameters or independence
between both the rm intercept and slope parameters and the other variables in the equation, i.e. the absence of
correlated e¤ects (for a comparison of the three di¤erent approaches, we refer to Mairesse and Griliches, 1990).
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to industries for which regime R = IC-PR holds (1845 rms). The third part presents the
estimates of rms belonging to industries for which regime R = PC-MO holds (899 rms).
Within each regime, we focus on the rm input shares, the estimated rm output elasticities,
the estimated rm joint market imperfections parameter and the relevant product and labor
market imperfection parameters.
The number of observations for each rm varies between 12 and 24. Hence, some rm-level
regression estimates might be imprecise. This could lead to the conclusion that all the observed
variability in the rm parameter estimates would be attributable to sampling variability and that
the true variability would thus be zero. Such conclusion, however, seems to be clearly an artefact
due to outliers. Therefore, we consider two variants of the original Swamy methodology:
one based on weighted estimates of true dispersion and one based on robust estimates of true
dispersion. As such, each part of Table 6 is divided into three sections. The rst section reports
the simple mean and the corresponding observed dispersion (bo) and (original) Swamy estimate
of true dispersion [btrue]. The second section reports the weighted mean and the corresponding
weighted observed dispersion (bo) and Swamy estimate of weighted true dispersion [btrue]. The
third section reports the median and the corresponding interquartile observed dispersion (bo)
and Swamy estimate of robust true dispersion [btrue].27 Since the second variant of the original
Swamy methodology is more intuitive, we focus on the robust estimates when discussing Table
6 (see infra).
Table A.4 in Appendix which is structured like Table 6provides some technical details on
the Swamy estimates of true dispersion. Within each regime, the rst section of Table A.4
presents the original Swamy estimate of true variance [b2true, corresponding to b in Eq. (28)],
which is computed as the di¤erence between the observed variance of the individually estimated
rm coe¢ cients [b2o, corresponding to term (1) in Eq. (28)] and the mean of the corresponding
sampling variance [b2s, corresponding to term (2) in Eq. (28)].28 The Swamy estimate of the
weighted true variance, which is calculated as the weighted observed variance minus the weighted
sampling variances, is reported in the second section within each regime of Table A.4.29 The
weight is dened as the inverse of the sampling variance. In the third section within each regime
of Table A.4, we report the Swamy estimate of the robust true variance, which is computed by
subtracting the median of the individually estimated sampling variances from the interquartile
observed variance. Each section presents a F -statistic, testing the hypothesis of equality of the
estimates.30
27The term interquartile observed dispersion indicates that the observed dispersion is computed from the
interquartile range of the rm input shares and rm estimates. When focusing on the Swamy estimate of robust
true dispersion, we assume that the individually estimated parameters are normally distributed and the sampling
variance is distributed as 2.
28Taking into account the unbalanced nature of the sample, the equivalent of Eq. (28) for the input shares
J (J = N;M;K) can be expressed as: e2true = 1N 1 NP
i=1
 
(J )i   J
2   1
T
e2s, where T = 24P
nt=12

Nnt
N
nt

,
(J )i =
1
T
ntP
t=1
(J )it, J =
1
N
NP
i=1
(J )i and e2s = 1N(T 1) NPi=1
ntP
t=1
 
(J )it   (J )i
2. nt denotes the number of
years within rm i and Nnt refers to the number of rms for which we observe nt years of observations.
29 In practice, the weighted sampling variance is calculated as N
NP
i=1
b2i .
30Except for bi and bi within IC-EB and bi and b"Nw 
i
within PC-MO, all the F -statistics are signicant
at conventional signicance levels since the critical value barely exceeds 1 for our sample size. One can question,
however, the validity of these F -statistics in such large samples. A more symmetric treatment of the inference
problem, advocated by Leamer (1978), would necessitate using a critical value which increases with the number
of degrees of freedom. This would decrease the likelihood of rejecting the hypothesis of homogeneity (Mairesse
and Griliches, 1990).
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Table 6
Summary firm analysis: Heterogeneity in firm-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperf. parameter b,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates
Regime  = -
[5715 firms]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b b
Simple mean
Observed dispersion b
True dispersion b
0.341
(0.130)
[0.122]
0.478
(0.135)
[0.126]
0.181
(0.097)
[0]
0.346
(0.243)
[0.102]
0.572
(0.223)
[0.154]
0.082
(0.215)
[0.092]
1.116
(0.302)
[0.210]
0.099
(1.391)
[0.875]
1.260
(0.586)
[0.387]
-2.298
(72.662)
[0]
0.439
(21.013)
[0]
Weighted mean
Weighted observed dispersion b
Weighted true dispersion b
0.378
(0.139)
[0.137]
0.534
(0.128)
[0.126]
0.272
(0.141)
[0.121]
0.269
(0.196)
[0.155]
0.600
(0.211)
[0.188]
0.061
(0.149)
[0.112]
1.114
(0.199)
[0.166]
0.506
(0.920)
[0.755]
1.182
(0.354)
[0.301]
1.017
(1.160)
[1.040]
0.803
(0.136)
[0.126]
Median
Interquartile observed dispersion b
Robust true dispersion b
0.330
(0.128)
[0.124]
0.482
(0.134)
[0.130]
0.156
(0.089)
[0]
0.298
(0.242)
[0.175]
0.587
(0.232)
[0.194]
0.077
(0.182)
[0.115]
1.108
(0.239)
[0.181]
0.297
(1.097)
[0.795]
1.204
(0.435)
[0.335]
0.431
(1.757)
[1.320]
0.582
(0.440)
[0.319]
Regime  = -
[1845 firms]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b
Simple mean
Observed dispersion b
True dispersion b
0.287
(0.106)
[0.097]
0.519
(0.119)
[0.108]
0.194
(0.100)
[0]
0.368
(0.252)
[0.060]
0.574
(0.229)
[0.146]
0.058
(0.221)
[0.066]
1.128
(0.294)
[0.191]
-0.338
(1.580)
[0.934]
1.135
(0.465)
[0.271]
Weighted mean
Weighted observed dispersion b
Weighted true dispersion b
0.299
(0.110)
[0.107]
0.578
(0.118)
[0.116]
0.276
(0.134)
[0.113]
0.294
(0.221)
[0.172]
0.610
(0.215)
[0.190]
0.051
(0.158)
[0.117]
1.122
(0.194)
[0.159]
0.220
(1.101)
[0.889]
1.116
(0.342)
[0.289]
Median
Interquartile observed dispersion b
Robust true dispersion b
0.271
(0.105)
[0.099]
0.526
(0.121)
[0.117]
0.174
(0.091)
[0]
0.324
(0.264)
[0.186]
0.580
(0.243)
[0.199]
0.058
(0.197)
[0.127]
1.117
(0.242)
[0.179]
-0.008
(1.318)
[0.954]
1.122
(0.407)
[0.303]
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Table 6 (ctd)
Summary firm analysis: Heterogeneity in firm-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperf. parameter b,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates
Regime  = -
[899 firms]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

Simple mean
Observed dispersion b
True dispersion b
0.230
(0.108)
[0.098]
0.559
(0.143)
[0.132]
0.211
(0.112)
[0]
0.368
(0.260)
[0.092]
0.554
(0.247)
[0.182]
0.078
(0.211)
[0.053]
1.085
(0.312)
[0.226]
-0.984
(2.325)
[1.427]
1.004
(0.436)
[0.264]
6.786
(79.36)
[0]
-20.307
(583.099)
[0]
Weighted mean
Weighted observed dispersion b
Weighted true dispersion b
0.261
(0.108)
[0.105]
0.650
(0.128)
[0.127]
0.300
(0.136)
[0.120]
0.264
(0.219)
[0.183]
0.615
(0.259)
[0.241]
0.044
(0.143)
[0.111]
1.116
(0.190)
[0.162]
-0.059
(1.218)
[1.011]
1.052
(0.319)
[0.278]
0.108
(0.163)
[0.108]
0.041
(0.208)
[0.151]
Median
Interquartile observed dispersion b
Robust true dispersion b
0.219
(0.116)
[0.111]
0.563
(0.154)
[0.151]
0.185
(0.109)
[0.035]
0.322
(0.267)
[0.208]
0.557
(0.287)
[0.254]
0.059
(0.172)
[0.106]
1.085
(0.247)
[0.185]
-0.462
(1.705)
[1.374]
1.015
(0.401)
[0.317]
0.694
(0.976)
[0.865]
0.194
(1.786)
[1.440]
 Technical details on the Swamy estimates of true variance are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix.
 Formulas of the market imperfection parameter estimates are given in footnote (b) of Table 5.
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How can we interpret the results reported in Table 6? Let us focus the discussion on the
median values. Across the three predominant regimes, the median values of the rm-level
output elasticities and the price-cost mark-up that would apply if rms were to consider input
prices as given prior to deciding their level of inputs are quite comparable. The median value ofb"QN
i
lies in the [0:298-0:322]-range, the median value of
b"QM
i
lies in the [0:557-0:587]-range,
the median value of
b"QK
i
lies in the [0:058-0:077]-range and the median value of bi only lies
in the [1:085-1:105]-range. The Swamy corresponding robust estimates of true dispersion are
within the [0:175-0:208]-range for
b"QN
i
, within the [0:194-0:254]-range for
b"QM
i
, within the
[0:106-0:127]-range for
b"QK
i
and within the [0:179-0:185]-range for bi only.
Focusing on the relevant market imperfection parameters within each regime leads to the fol-
lowing insights.
 Within R = IC-EB, the median joint market imperfections parameter
b i is estimated
at 0.297 which is close to the median value at the industry level (0.315, see Table 5). The
Swamy robust estimate of true dispersion amounts to 0.795, providing evidence of very
sizeable within-regime rm dispersion for IC-EB. From b i, we retrieve that the median
of the estimated price-cost mark-up (bi) is 1.204 and the median of the estimated extent of
rent sharing
bi is 0.582.31 The Swamy corresponding robust estimates of true dispersion
of 0.335 and 0.319 respectively are good indicators of a credible amount of dispersion. The
corresponding industry-specic median values are 1.188 for bj and 0.363 for bj .
 Within R = IC-PR, the median of b i is -0.008 which clearly deviates from the median
value of 0.048 at the industry level. Indeed, the Swamy robust estimate of true dispersion
of 0.954 points to large within-regime rm di¤erences. The median of bi is 1.122 with
a Swamy corresponding robust estimate of true dispersion of 0.303. This rm median is
equivalent to the industry median (1.123).
 Within R = PC-MO, the median of b i is -0.462 (compared to -0.563 at the industry
level). The Swamy corresponding robust estimate of true dispersion of 1.374 illustrates
the considerable amount of rm dispersion. From b i, we infer that the median of bi is
1.015 and the median of
b"Nw 
i
is 0.194. The Swamy corresponding robust estimates of
true dispersion of 0.317 and 1.440 respectively give evidence of substantial within-regime
rm dispersion for PC-MO. The industry-specic median values are 0.984 for bj and
1.711 for
b"Nw 
j
.
Going back to the more technical details of the Swamy estimates (see Table A.4 in Appendix) and
focusing on the original Swamy estimates, it follows that the observed variance
b2o illustrates
the sizeable dispersion in the estimated rm output elasticities and the derived parameters. As
referred to above, the dispersion at the rm level is largely magnied by large sampling errors
arising from the rather short time series available. Due to the large sampling variance
b2s,
we even nd zero estimates of true variance in the individually estimated relative and absolute
31At the rm level, the correlation between bi only and bi amounts to 0.45. For 61.7% of the rms, the lack of
explicit consideration of labor market imperfections results in an underestimation of the rm-specic price-cost
mark-up.
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extents of rent sharing bi and bi within regime R = IC-EB and in the individually estimated bi
and labor supply elasticity
b"Nw 
i
within regime R = PC-MO. In contrast, we nd persistent
individual rm di¤erences in both the rm input shares, the rm estimated elasticities and the
derived parameters within each regime when focusing on the Swamy estimate of the weighted
true variance and the Swamy estimate of the robust true variance. For all the rm estimates, the
weighted (interquartile) observed variance and even more sothe weighted (robust) sampling
variance are considerably smaller than the corresponding simple observed and simple sampling
variance. As such, the Swamy estimate of the weighted (robust) true variance exceeds the
corresponding Swamy estimate of the simple true variance within the three regimes.
Summing up, we observe quite sizeable within-regime rm dispersion in the joint market imper-
fections parameter and the corresponding product and labor market imperfection parameters
for the three predominant regimes to which the industries belong. This statement holds even
if we focus on true dispersion. This main nding can be interpreted in two ways. First, pro-
duction behavior of rms within industries that are classied in the same regime is indeed truly
heterogeneous. Following this interpretation, we investigate in the next section which rm-
specic factors correlate with the market imperfection parameters within the dominant regime
(IC-EB). Second, from the true dispersion of the joint market imperfections parameter, we
derive that for rms within R = IC-EB and R = PC-MO, there is room to move to another
regime. Although we might expect that a majority of rms within an industry belong to the
same regime as that particular industry, this presumption might be rebutted. Indeed, given that
we condition the rm analysis on the industry classication, the substantial true rm dispersion
might indicate that although the representative rm is characterized by the same regime as the
industry to which it belongs, regime di¤erences across rms within a given industry could be
important. This calls for an extension of our analysis which we consider as a topic for future
research.
5.3 Di¤erent dimensions across rms within the IC-EB-regime
Similarly to what we do for the industry-level estimates to assess their plausibility (see Section
4.3), we investigate how the market imperfection parameters of rms within R = IC-EB corre-
late with rm-specic variables like size, capital intensity, being an R&D rm and distance to
the industry technology frontier.
We concentrate on the joint market imperfections parameter and the corresponding price-cost
mark-up and the relative extent of rent-sharing parameters of the 5715 rms within R = IC-EB.
More specically, the dependent variable is either the vector of ln
b i, the vector of ln(bi   1)
or the vector of ln(bi). For each of these dependent variables, we have four di¤erent matrices of
regressors. Each set consists of a rm-specic variable (size, capital intensity, the R&D identier,
distance to the industry technology frontier) and industry dummies. All variables are centered
around the industry mean.
Being resistant to the inuence of outliers, we focus the discussion on the median regressions.
For reasons of completeness, we also present the OLS and the WLS where the weight is dened
as the inverse of the sampling varianceregression coe¢ cients of the set of regressors explaining
the vector of ln
b i, the vector of ln(bi   1) or the vector of ln(bi) in Table 7. The 0:50
quantile regression can be interpreted as a robust equivalent of OLS. The regression coe¢ cients
result from regressions with one rm-specic variable (including industry dummies), except for
the regression including the R&D identier which includes two rm-specic variables (mixentri
and rdentri) and industry dummies.
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Size (ni) is measured by the logarithm of the average number of employees in each rm. To the
extent that large rms are typically multi-product rms, we might expect a positive correlation
between rm size and price-cost mark-ups (Sutton, 1998). Based on the standard rent-sharing
literature, rm size and the relative extent of rent-sharing parameter are expected to be posi-
tively correlated. However, we nd a negative correlation between size and both bi and bi.
Capital intensity is usually included in structure-performance models to capture the di¤erence
between capital-intensive and non-capital-intensive rms. We measure this variable (capinti) by
the logarithm of the gross book-value of xed assets divided by sales. Since capital equipment
usually constitutes sunk costs and the latter may necessitate mark-up pricing, we expect a
positive correlation between capital intensity and price-cost mark-ups (see e.g. Odagiri and
Yamashita, 1987). Likewise, capital intensity is expected to be positively correlated with the
relative extent of rent sharing. The intuition is that if a bargaining partner receives extra
income in case of a disagreement, this partner is more willing to tolerate disagreement and
hence bargains for a larger share of the rents. In some studies (see e.g. Doiron, 1992), these
costs are interpreted as strike costs in case the negotiating parties use strikes as a dispute
resolution mechanism. Among other things, higher capital intensity is shown to increase a
rms strike costs and hence to decrease its extent of rent sharing (see e.g. Clark 1991, 1993;
Doiron, 1992). From Table 7, it follows that capital-intensive rms are characterized by a higherbi. In contrast, bi appears to be negatively correlated with capital intensity although this result
is not sensitive to running a multivariate specication.32
We capture technological change by an R&D variable and a measure of the distance of a rm to
its industry technology frontier. To construct the R&D variable, we merge accounting informa-
tion of the considered rms from EAE (SESSI) with data of Research & Development collected
by DEP (Ministère de lEducation et de la Recherche). The R&D surveys (DEP) provide two
R&D variables: a dichotomous R&D indicator and total R&D expenditure. We assume that
the sample is exhaustive, i.e. a rm that does not report any R&D expenditure is considered to
be a non-R&D rm. Based on this criterion, we dene three subsamples: the pure non-R&D
rms, the mixed R&D rms for which we have data on R&D expenditure for less than 12 years
(mixentri) and the pure R&D rms for which we have data on R&D expenditure for at least
12 years (rdentri).33 Our measure of the average distance of a rm to its industry technology
frontier is constructed as follows: disti = p95 ln
 
V A
N

j
  ln  V AN ij , where i is a rm index, j
an industry index and V AN real value added per employee. To drop outliers, we use the 95
th
percentile instead of the maximum. As suggested by Sutton (1991, 1998), an increase in the
competitive environment might elicit an endogeneous reaction of rms through an increase in
R&D spending, inducing less technology-intensive rms to exit the market. Hence, we might
expect a positive correlation between R&D expenditures and price-cost mark-ups. Technolog-
ical change might exert an e¤ect on the relative extent of rent sharing by a¤ecting the nature
of the production process. However, this e¤ect is a priori unclear. As discussed in Horn and
Wolinsky (1988) and Betcherman (1991), it depends on the importance of labor costs in the
rms total costs and on the workerssubstitutability in the production process. From Table 7,
it follows that rms which are further from the industry technology frontier are characterized by
a higher bi. bi appears to be negatively correlated with one of our technology variables (disti).
The latter result is consistent with the industry analysis that also reveals that low-technology
industries seem to be typied by a higher extent of rent sharing.
32 In particular, we ran multivariate specications for each set of regressors where we included all rm-specic
variables and industry dummies. Results not reported but available upon request.
33Among the 5715 rms within R = IC-EB, 121 rms are identied as pure R&D rms, 476 as mixed R&D
rms and the complement5118 as pure non-R&D rms.
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Table 7
Correlations between the joint market imperfections parameter ln
b i,
the corresponding price-cost mark-up taking into account labor market imperfections ln(bi   1)
and relative extent of rent sharing ln(bi), and rm-specic observables
OLS, WLS and median regression coe¢ cients
Regime R = IC-EB
[5715 rms]
ni capinti mixentri rdentri disti
^OLS
ln
b i -0.081(0.021) -0.013(0.028) -0.094(0.074) -0.100(0.155) 0.123(0.064)
ln(bi   1) -0.108(0.020) 0.075(0.029) -0.208(0.072) -0.070(0.138) 0.304(0.061)
ln(bi) -0.290(0.022) -0.138(0.032) 0.361(0.081) -0.413(0.159) 1.208(0.067)
^WLS
ln
b i -0.033(0.043) -0.024(0.058) 0.219(0.117) -0.064(0.203) -0.248(0.174)
ln(bi   1) -0.080(0.027) 0.127(0.037) -0.119(0.115) -0.316(0.122) 0.309(0.068)
ln(bi) -0.213(0.044) -0.229(0.046) -0.607(0.063) -0.846(0.098) 0.947(0.108)
^(0:50)
ln
b i -0.084(0.018) 0.002(0.028) -0.066(0.070) -0.038(0.146) 0.089(0.059)
ln(bi   1) -0.093(0.017) 0.098(0.025) -0.118(0.066) 0.035(0.137) 0.248(0.073)
ln(bi) -0.316(0.021) -0.153(0.032) -0.336(0.092) -0.352(0.191) 1.181(0.064)
 Signicant at 1%,  Signicant at 5%,  Signicant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) The dependent and the explanatory variables are centered around the industry mean.
(2) The coe¢ cients are for single rm-specic variable regressions (including industry dummies), except for the regression
including the R&D identier which includes two rm-specic variables (mixentri and rdentri) and industry dummies.
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6 Conclusion
This study starts from the belief that product and labor markets are intrinsically characterized
by distortions and imperfections and from the nding that variable input factors estimated
marginal products are often larger than their measured payments. We provide two extensions of
Halls (1988) productivity econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins. The rst
one embeds a standard labor (e¢ cient) bargaining model between the rm and its employees into
this framework, while the second extension abstains from the assumption that the labor supply
curve facing the rm is perfectly elastic and integrates the monopsony model as an alternative to
the e¢ cient bargaining model. Both extensions identify product and labor market imperfections
as two sources of discrepancies between the output contributions of individual production factors
and their respective revenue shares, and they can be tested on the basis of the sign of a parameter
of joint product and labor market imperfections.
Using an unbalanced panel of 10646 French rms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period
1978-2001, we are able to classify these industries into 6 regimes depending on the type of
competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one
of imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market
(IC-EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect
competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (IC-PR), and by a regime of
perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC-MO). The
median price-cost mark-up and extent of rent-sharing parameters in the IC-EB-industries are of
about 1.20 and 0.55 respectively, while the median price-cost mark-up in the IC-PR-industries
is of about 1.10 and the median of the wage labor supply elasticity in the PC-MO-industries is
of about 1.70. The random coe¢ cient regression analyses that we perform at the rm individual
level in these three predominant regimes basically conrm well these average orders of magnitude
with large, yet not unreasonable, robust estimates of true dispersion (i.e. corrected for sampling
dispersion). Finally, we nd quite encouraging results in the two exploratory investigations of
the plausibility of our ndings that we could do in the case of the dominant regime (IC-EB) by
relating our industry and rm-level estimates of price-cost mark-ups and extent of rent sharing
to industry characteristics and rm-specic variables respectively.
Our analysis can be pursued in several directions, either to address some of its current limitations
and investigate some new developments, or to adopt a more ambitious approach. We will
conclude by very briey suggesting six such directions that are worth following but encounter
data di¢ culties and/or intrinsic identication problems. The rst three relate to limitations
which also potentially a¤ect many and mostmicroeconometric studies of rm productivity:
the fact (i) that we have mostly assumed in our analysis constant returns to scale, (ii) that
we have not taken into account explicitly the potential consequences of labor adjustment costs
on our estimates of labor and product market imperfections, and (iii) that we are actually
estimating a revenue production function rather than an output production function for lack of
rm-level output price indices. As we have explained, it is intrinsically di¢ cult to separately
identify and estimate an average elasticity of scale and an average price-cost mark-up; and
this di¢ culty is magnied when in order to control for unobserved rm individual e¤ects the
estimation is only or mainly based on the time dimension variability of the data. As we also
pointed out, labor adjustment costs resulting from employment protection legislation and other
institutional factors may account for part of the estimated wedge between labor output share
and elasticity, with the e¤ect that our estimates of the extent of rent sharing (which are indeed
on the high side) could be biased upwardly. We tend to think that this e¤ect should be limited,
but this will need further analysis both to use rm capacity utilization and hours of work
variables, which are unavailable for our dataset, and to resort to a dynamic specication of rm
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productivity changes. Not estimating sensu stricto a production function for lack of rm output
price information can also be a cause of biases in our estimates, that has been addressed with
mixed results in Crépon et al. (2005) following a solution suggested by Klette and Griliches
(1996). The unavailability of rm-level price data is a major drawback in microeconometric
studies of rm behavior, and is clearly an important avenue for current and future research.34
The rst of the other three promising directions of research is the use of matched employer-
employee data both to take into account worker (and rm) characteristics that can be observed
(such as skills in particular) and to control for unobserved ones.35 The second one is more
technical; it would be to investigate further the rm heterogeneity of product and labor market
imperfections within industry and regime by using latent class models versus random coe¢ cient
models, following the line of research initiated by Windmeijer (2010). Finally, the third would
be to go back to the tradition of structural modeling of rm behavior pioneered some seventy
years ago by Marschak and Andrews (1944) and address frontally the formidable problems it has
been continuously raising since in spite of the formidable advances in econometrics methodology
and practices.
34For a recent discussion and work related to this issue, see Griliches and Mairesse (1998), Melitz (2000),
Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005), Foster et al. (2005), Levinsohn and Melitz (2006), Katayama et al. (2009) and
Syverson (2010).
35This is what we have started in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2010) where we compare industry di¤erences
in average rent-sharing parameters based on three di¤erent approaches: the present one based on estimating a
productivity equation on rm-level data, the usual one in labor econometrics based on estimating a wage equation
on worker-level data, and a pure accounting approach based on measuring the rm user cost of capital and an
average worker external reservation wage.
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Appendix: Detailed results
Table A.1
Summary industry analysis: Industry-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

GMM SYS (− 2)(− 3)
Regime  = -
[17 industries]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b b
Industry mean 0.334 0.488 0.178 0.316 (0.034) 0.632 (0.028) 0.052 (0.025) 1.174 (0.029) 0.350 (0.150) 1.301 (0.058) 0.501 (0.211) 0.295 (0.136)
Industry 1 0.294 0.470 0.165 0.264 (0.030) 0.606 (0.023) 0.022 (0.020) 1.142 (0.024) 0.221 (0.115) 1.253 (0.044) 0.311 (0.132) 0.237 (0.055)
Industry 2 0.333 0.482 0.177 0.314 (0.035) 0.636 (0.030) 0.047 (0.024) 1.173 (0.026) 0.354 (0.165) 1.296 (0.060) 0.503 (0.214) 0.335 (0.084)
Industry 3 0.379 0.513 0.187 0.359 (0.039) 0.674 (0.033) 0.075 (0.029) 1.219 (0.033) 0.443 (0.183) 1.348 (0.065) 0.685 (0.239) 0.407 (0.142)
Regime  = -
[10 industries]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b
Industry mean 0.287 0.520 0.193 0.342 (0.036) 0.642 (0.034) 0.016 (0.029) 1.223 (0.035) 0.035 (0.176) 1.237 (0.065)
Industry 1 0.257 0.496 0.170 0.301 (0.033) 0.600 (0.028) -0.006 (0.025) 1.174 (0.030) 0.027 (0.137) 1.133 (0.053)
Industry 2 0.286 0.531 0.197 0.339 (0.037) 0.649 (0.033) 0.019 (0.027) 1.234 (0.034) 0.050 (0.180) 1.260 (0.063)
Industry 3 0.330 0.538 0.213 0.364 (0.042) 0.687 (0.040) 0.034 (0.034) 1.281 (0.037) 0.083 (0.207) 1.290 (0.075)
Regime  = -
[8 industries]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

Industry mean 0.223 0.565 0.211 0.309 (0.041) 0.650 (0.036) 0.041 (0.038) 1.204 (0.045) -0.273 (0.236) 1.152 (0.065) 0.835 (0.149) 4.681 (60.01)
Industry 1 0.160 0.508 0.195 0.264 (0.034) 0.585 (0.030) 0.008 (0.029) 1.154 (0.036) -0.486 (0.199) 1.107 (0.055) 0.706 (0.107) 1.514 (1.796)
Industry 2 0.231 0.548 0.212 0.331 (0.041) 0.646 (0.037) 0.028 (0.037) 1.199 (0.040) -0.158 (0.247) 1.132 (0.067) 0.883 (0.146) 5.308 (12.11)
Industry 3 0.281 0.630 0.234 0.349 (0.045) 0.715 (0.041) 0.064 (0.048) 1.247 (0.060) -0.085 (0.268) 1.189 (0.077) 0.936 (0.170) 8.852 (116.4)
First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
 Detailed information on the industry-specific estimates is presented in Table A.2 [Part 2] in Appendix.
 Formulas of the market imperfection parameter estimates are given in footnote (b) of Table 5.
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Table A.2
Industry analysis: Industry-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Part 1: OLS DIF
Regime  = - [17 industries] OLS DIF
Industry  # Firms ( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b b
37 599 0.322 0.442 0.236 0.337 (0.010) 0.526 (0.009) 0.137 (0.008) 1.144 (0.011) 0.141 (0.045) 1.188 (0.019) 0.162 (0.049) 0.140 (0.037)
26 391 0.294 0.471 0.236 0.309 (0.012) 0.571 (0.011) 0.120 (0.010) 1.068 (0.013) 0.162 (0.061) 1.214 (0.024) 0.166 (0.060) 0.143 (0.044)
24 205 0.265 0.497 0.238 0.261 (0.016) 0.585 (0.012) 0.154 (0.014) 1.135 (0.015) 0.191 (0.075) 1.177 (0.024) 0.180 (0.068) 0.153 (0.049)
17 171 0.286 0.594 0.120 0.265 (0.016) 0.645 (0.013) 0.090 (0.014) 1.054 (0.016) 0.160 (0.072) 1.085 (0.022) 0.352 (0.153) 0.261 (0.084)
23 203 0.385 0.450 0.165 0.375 (0.018) 0.518 (0.014) 0.107 (0.016) 1.090 (0.018) 0.177 (0.069) 1.150 (0.032) 0.360 (0.132) 0.264 (0.072)
33 600 0.282 0.552 0.166 0.256 (0.008) 0.641 (0.008) 0.103 (0.007) 1.099 (0.009) 0.254 (0.040) 1.162 (0.014) 0.370 (0.054) 0.270 (0.029)
28 310 0.334 0.483 0.183 0.289 (0.012) 0.566 (0.011) 0.145 (0.010) 1.078 (0.012) 0.308 (0.054) 1.173 (0.023) 0.478 (0.075) 0.324 (0.035)
27 1270 0.309 0.514 0.178 0.274 (0.013) 0.634 (0.011) 0.091 (0.011) 1.143 (0.012) 0.347 (0.060) 1.235 (0.022) 0.489 (0.078) 0.328 (0.035)
7 213 0.334 0.470 0.197 0.281 (0.015) 0.596 (0.013) 0.123 (0.012) 1.138 (0.015) 0.426 (0.065) 1.269 (0.027) 0.569 (0.076) 0.363 (0.031)
6 453 0.424 0.398 0.178 0.370 (0.011) 0.457 (0.008) 0.173 (0.009) 1.037 (0.011) 0.277 (0.039) 1.150 (0.020) 0.573 (0.073) 0.364 (0.029)
5 518 0.285 0.528 0.187 0.207 (0.009) 0.646 (0.011) 0.148 (0.008) 1.079 (0.011) 0.499 (0.046) 1.223 (0.020) 0.621 (0.049) 0.383 (0.018)
11 322 0.317 0.518 0.165 0.254 (0.011) 0.628 (0.011) 0.118 (0.010) 1.095 (0.012) 0.408 (0.052) 1.211 (0.022) 0.645 (0.073) 0.392 (0.027)
8 724 0.341 0.478 0.181 0.286 (0.008) 0.615 (0.008) 0.099 (0.005) 1.126 (0.007) 0.451 (0.037) 1.288 (0.016) 0.661 (0.047) 0.398 (0.017)
35 138 0.333 0.491 0.177 0.276 (0.017) 0.640 (0.016) 0.093 (0.015) 1.161 (0.018) 0.475 (0.075) 1.306 (0.033) 0.685 (0.093) 0.406 (0.033)
22 286 0.379 0.482 0.139 0.313 (0.015) 0.566 (0.011) 0.121 (0.013) 1.073 (0.014) 0.347 (0.054) 1.174 (0.022) 0.808 (0.115) 0.447 (0.035)
36 1000 0.385 0.443 0.172 0.317 (0.007) 0.577 (0.005) 0.106 (0.005) 1.129 (0.006) 0.481 (0.027) 1.303 (0.012) 0.925 (0.039) 0.452 (0.012)
18 294 0.406 0.482 0.112 0.341 (0.011) 0.556 (0.008) 0.103 (0.010) 1.053 (0.011) 0.315 (0.040) 1.153 (0.017) 0.992 (0.114) 0.498 (0.029)
Total 6697 0.335 0.480 0.185 0.294 (0.003) 0.584 (0.003) 0.122 1.106 (0.003) 0.341 (0.070) 1.217 (0.007) 1.123 (0.016) 0.529 (0.003)
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Table A.2 (ctd)
Industry analysis: Industry-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Part 1: OLS DIF (ctd)
Regime  = - [10 industries] OLS DIF
Industry  # Firms ( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b
20 268 0.313 0.535 0.152 0.322 (0.015) 0.574 (0.012) 0.103 (0.012) 1.063 (0.013) 0.043 (0.065) 1.073 (0.022)
29 475 0.257 0.538 0.205 0.292 (0.010) 0.579 (0.010) 0.128 (0.008) 1.090 (0.010) -0.063 (0.053) 1.076 (0.019)
16 110 0.245 0.496 0.159 0.352 (0.021) 0.536 (0.015) 0.112 (0.018) 1.066 (0.019) 0.061 (0.082) 1.081(0.030)
38 319 0.230 0.500 0.170 0.365 (0.013) 0.550 (0.010) 0.085 (0.010) 1.102 (0.011) -0.007 (0.055) 1.100 (0.021)
13 156 0.322 0.465 0.213 0.323 (0.018) 0.519 (0.017) 0.158 (0.017) 1.081 (0.021) 0.111 (0.081) 1.115 (0.037)
34 125 0.218 0.569 0.213 0.279 (0.024) 0.643 (0.019) 0.078 (0.017) 1.153 (0.020) -0.150 (0.135) 1.131 (0.033)
14 133 0.258 0.558 0.185 0.296 (0.020) 0.646 (0.017) 0.059 (0.014) 1.155 (0.017) 0.011 (0.101) 1.157 (0.031)
12 179 0.331 0.480 0.188 0.351 (0.016) 0.559 (0.014) 0.091 (0.012) 1.131 (0.015) 0.105 (0.073) 1.163 (0.029)
15 129 0.259 0.533 0.108 0.287 (0.017) 0.630 (0.014) 0.083 (0.014) 1.167 (0.016) 0.074 (0.085) 1.182 (0.026)
30 330 0.237 0.529 0.234 0.275 (0.012) 0.642 (0.012) 0.084 (0.008) 1.200 (0.011) 0.053 (0.070) 1.212 (0.022)
Total 2224 0.282 0.520 0.198 0.309 (0.006) 0.595 (0.006) 0.096 1.136 (0.006) 0.050 (0.031) 1.144 (0.011)
Regime  = - [8 industries] OLS DIF
Industry  # Firms ( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

4 126 0.116 0.681 0.202 0.240 (0.022) 0.656 (0.027) 0.104 (0.017) 1.061 (0.027) -1.099 (0.225) 0.963 (0.039) 0.457 (0.060) 0.876 (0.210)
2 122 0.137 0.693 0.170 0.234 (0.022) 0.675 (0.026) 0.092 (0.016) 1.049 (0.014) -0.734 (0.192) 0.974 (0.037) 0.570 (0.072) 1.326 (0.391)
9 130 0.232 0.530 0.238 0.385 (0.024) 0.527 (0.022) 0.088 (0.018) 1.122 (0.025) -0.668 (0.135) 0.994 (0.041) 0.598 (0.057) 1.489 (0.354)
3 106 0.183 0.579 0.238 0.288 (0.022) 0.549 (0.021) 0.163 (0.021) 1.027 (0.028) -0.621 (0.140) 0.949 (0.036) 0.604 (0.060) 1.528 (0.385)
32 171 0.230 0.565 0.205 0.337 (0.021) 0.541 (0.019) 0.123 (0.015) 1.058 (0.020) -0.505 (0.116) 0.957 (0.034) 0.654 (0.059) 1.894 (0.495)
10 114 0.250 0.531 0.219 0.339 (0.021) 0.532 (0.019) 0.129 (0.015) 1.080 (0.021) -0.356 (0.111) 1.002 (0.036) 0.738 (0.066) 2.811 (0.959)
25 104 0.312 0.459 0.229 0.423 (0.016) 0.472 (0.022) 0.105 (0.019) 1.126 (0.025) -0.328 (0.122) 1.028 (0.048) 0.758 (0.076) 3.136 (1.296)
19 182 0.326 0.486 0.188 0.381 (0.019) 0.502 (0.015) 0.117 (0.014) 1.070 (0.017) -0.137 (0.082) 1.032 (0.031) 0.883 (0.065) 7.533 (4.702)
Total 1055 0.228 0.561 0.211 0.332 (0.010) 0.553 (0.010) 0.115 1.095 (0.010) -0.471 (0.059) 0.986 (0.018) 0.677 (0.031) 2.092 (0.297)
Regime  = - [2 industries] OLS DIF
Industry  # Firms ( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

31 192 0.260 0.544 0.196 0.339 (0.016) 0.566 (0.015) 0.094 (0.013) 1.100 (0.016) -0.265 (0.085) 1.041 (0.028) 0.797 (0.055) 3.935 (1.351)
1 324 0.201 0.606 0.192 0.255 (0.012) 0.638 (0.013) 0.106 (0.009) 1.090 (0.012) -0.214 (0.080) 1.053 (0.022) 0.831 (0.055) 4.927 (1.943)
Total 516 0.221 0.585 0.194 0.285 (0.013) 0.605 (0.015) 0.110 1.122 (0.012) 0.275 (0.067) 1.203 (0.029) 1.296 (0.085) -4.374 (0.973)
Regime  = - [1 industry] OLS DIF
Industry  # Firms ( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b
21 154 0.300 0.553 0.147 0.344 (0.021) 0.556 (0.016) 0.099 (0.016) 1.037 (0.018) -0.139 (0.093) 1.006 (0.030)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table A.2 (ctd)
Industry analysis: Industry-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Part 2: GMM SYS
Regime  = - [17 industries] GMM SYS (t-2) (t-3)
Industry  # Firms
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b b  1 2
37 599 0.238 (0.040) 0.692 (0.032) 0.070 (0.024) 1.243 (0.029) 0.021 (0.182) 1.564 (0.072) 0.719 (0.132) 0.418 (0.045) 0.000 -11.94 -2.24
26 391 0.252 (0.032) 0.659 (0.030) 0.088 (0.028) 1.189 (0.038) 0.066 (0.210) 1.401 (0.064) 0.482 (0.120) 0.325 (0.055) 0.015 -9.16 -2.00
24 205 0.264 (0.038) 0.623 (0.030) 0.113 (0.020) 1.174 (0.024) 0.755 (0.260) 1.253 (0.061) 0.227 (0.167) 0.185 (0.111) 1.000 -6.16 0.52
17 171 0.331 (0.049) 0.626 (0.036) 0.043 (0.029) 1.081 (0.026) 0.355 (0.337) 1.053 (0.060) -0.238 (0.520) -0.312 (0.894) 1.000 -6.24 0.27
23 203 0.409 (0.040) 0.563 (0.041) 0.028 (0.041) 1.162 (0.050) 0.238 (0.208) 1.249 (0.092) 0.348 (0.292) 0.258 (0.161) 1.000 -8.18 -2.72
33 600 0.298 (0.034) 0.654 (0.027) 0.047 (0.019) 1.147 (0.021) 0.875 (0.187) 1.185 (0.048) 0.180 (0.229) 0.152 (0.164) 0.000 -12.15 -2.98
28 310 0.359 (0.042) 0.626 (0.034) 0.015 (0.027) 1.227 (0.031) 0.256 (0.189) 1.296 (0.070) 0.311 (0.244) 0.237 (0.142) 0.435 -8.87 -2.96
27 1270 0.280 (0.039) 0.674 (0.030) 0.046 (0.023) 1.193 (0.024) 0.190 (0.242) 1.312 (0.058) 0.536 (0.214) 0.349 (0.091) 0.692 -7.98 -1.73
7 213 0.359 (0.039) 0.566 (0.035) 0.075 (0.037) 1.164 (0.045) 0.286 (0.216) 1.206 (0.075) 0.183 (0.228) 0.155 (0.163) 0.999 -6.25 0.30
6 453 0.399 (0.030) 0.526 (0.017) 0.075 (0.029) 1.213 (0.033) 0.332 (0.174) 1.323 (0.043) 0.685 (0.157) 0.407 (0.055) 0.004 -9.91 -2.40
5 518 0.239 (0.016) 0.677 (0.023) 0.084 (0.022) 1.117 (0.028) 0.818 (0.175) 1.281 (0.043) 0.527 (0.086) 0.345 (0.037) 0.006 -9.15 -2.24
11 322 0.314 (0.042) 0.698 (0.034) -0.012 (0.030) 1.247 (0.033) 0.542 (0.202) 1.348 (0.065) 0.503 (0.239) 0.335 (0.106) 0.676 -9.46 -2.81
8 724 0.295 (0.024) 0.682 (0.021) 0.023 (0.014) 1.219 (0.018) 1.079 (0.143) 1.429 (0.045) 0.746 (0.121) 0.427 (0.040) 1.000 -10.59 -0.33
35 138 0.335 (0.028) 0.668 (0.021) -0.003 (0.022) 1.244 (0.025) 0.752 (0.246) 1.362 (0.044) 0.490 (0.147) 0.329 (0.066) 1.000 -7.18 -0.58
22 286 0.261 (0.035) 0.636 (0.025) 0.103 (0.026) 1.100 (0.027) 0.880 (0.215) 1.320 (0.052) 1.306 (0.230) 0.566 (0.043) 0.995 -9.91 2.41
36 1000 0.372 (0.020) 0.563 (0.017) 0.065 (0.023) 1.142 (0.016) 1.051 (0.125) 1.272 (0.038) 0.537 (0.132) 0.349 (0.056) 0.000 -16.96 -3.45
18 294 0.373 (0.030) 0.606 (0.030) 0.021 (0.016) 1.104 (0.018) 0.881 (0.180) 1.258 (0.061) 0.982 (0.332) 0.495 (0.084) 0.998 -8.24 0.59
Total 6697 0.287 (0.010) 0.676 (0.009) 0.037 1.198 (0.009) 0.551 (0.046) 1.409 (0.020) 1.326 (0.038) 0.570 (0.007) 0.000 -31.89 -3.12
First-step robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported.
(1) Input shares: see Part 1 of this table.
(2) Instruments used: the lagged levels of ,  and  dated (− 2) and (− 3) in the first-diﬀerenced equations and
the lagged first-diﬀerences of ,  and  dated (− 1) in the levels equations.
(3) : test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 2 . -values are reported.
(4) 1 and2 : tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as(0 1).
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Table A.2 (ctd)
Industry analysis: Industry-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperfections parameter b ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Part 2: GMM SYS (ctd)
Regime  = - [10 industries] GMM SYS (t-2) (t-3)
Industry  # Firms
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b  1 2
20 268 0.447 (0.039) 0.606 (0.040) -0.053 (0.027) 1.222 (0.033) 0.635 (0.293) 1.133 (0.074) 0.983 -8.95 -1.79
29 475 0.301 (0.023) 0.665 (0.027) 0.034 (0.020) 1.220 (0.027) -0.053 (0.202) 1.236 (0.050) 0.619 -11.45 -2.05
16 110 0.342 (0.042) 0.632 (0.030) 0.026 (0.034) 1.174 (0.037) 0.014 (0.246) 1.276 (0.061) 1.000 -5.89 -1.79
38 319 0.356 (0.035) 0.558 (0.038) 0.086 (0.025) 1.102 (0.031) -0.217 (0.232) 1.116 (0.075) 0.172 -8.07 -1.86
13 156 0.406 (0.041) 0.600 (0.040) -0.006 (0.035) 1.281 (0.046) -0.604 (0.246) 1.290 (0.086) 1.000 -7.38 0.90
34 125 0.267 (0.034) 0.714 (0.045) 0.019 (0.037) 1.249 (0.049) -0.198 (0.421) 1.255 (0.080) 1.000 -6.16 0.52
14 133 0.364 (0.042) 0.581 (0.037) 0.055 (0.026) 1.157 (0.030) 0.005 (0.263) 1.042 (0.066) 1.000 -6.57 -0.34
12 179 0.337 (0.033) 0.688 (0.025) -0.025 (0.027) 1.285 (0.032) -0.441 (0.242) 1.431 (0.052) 1.000 -7.58 -2.44
15 129 0.307 (0.043) 0.674 (0.029) 0.019 (0.033) 1.245(0.034) -0.072 (0.280) 1.265 (0.054) 1.000 -5.42 -1.98
30 330 0.295 (0.024) 0.703 (0.028) 0.002 (0.025) 1.295 (0.035) 0.119 (0.228) 1.328 (0.053) 0.100 -8.52 -3.32
Total 2224 0.272 (0.015) 0.732 (0.015) -0.004 1.253 (0.014) 0.443 (0.078) 1.408 (0.001) 0.000 -20.73 -4.68
Regime  = - [8 industries] GMM SYS (t-2) (t-3)
Industry  # Firms
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

 1 2
4 126 0.217 (0.029) 0.754 (0.046) 0.028 (0.049) 1.186 (0.064) -1.378 (0.525) 1.107 (0.067) 0.592 (0.093) 1.453 (0.562) 1.000 -2.07 -2.45
2 122 0.152 (0.035) 0.797 (0.024) 0.051 (0.027) 1.147 (0.025) -1.307 (0.600) 1.151 (0.035) 1.034 (0.255) -30.22 (218.1) 1.000 -4.03 -0.68
9 130 0.329 (0.046) 0.677 (0.027) -0.005 (0.037) 1.309 (0.040) -1.371 (0.478) 1.276 (0.051) 0.899 (0.150) 8.937 (14.78) 1.000 -4.37 -1.24
3 106 0.331 (0.044) 0.640 (0.038) 0.028 (0.052) 1.228 (0.058) -1.033 (0.408) 1.107 (0.036) 0.612 (0.096) 1.574 (0.637) 1.000 -4.39 -1.42
32 171 0.311 (0.033) 0.611 (0.033) 0.078 (0.028) 1.162 (0.037) -0.833 (0.315) 1.081 (0.059) 0.800 (0.118) 4.012 (2.955) 1.000 -5.28 -1.67
10 114 0.341 (0.039) 0.652 (0.037) 0.006 (0.030) 1.266 (0.036) -0.986 (0.300) 1.228 (0.069) 0.898 (0.143) 8.768 (13.69) 1.000 -5.30 0.43
25 104 0.357 (0.053) 0.512 (0.039) 0.131 (0.048) 1.128 (0.062) -0.509 (0.242) 1.115 (0.086) 0.973 (0.157) 36.32 (218.8) 1.000 -3.74 -1.36
19 182 0.431 (0.062) 0.559 (0.042) 0.010 (0.037) 1.211 (0.039) -0.249 (0.259) 1.149 (0.087) 0.869 (0.182) 7.533 (10.53) 1.000 -7.77 -0.34
Total 1055 0.224 (0.024) 0.733 (0.022) 0.043 1.223 (0.024) 0.325 (0.133) 1.307 (0.039) 1.332 (0.171) -4.011 (1.549) 0.000 -11.58 -1.90
Regime  = - [2 industries] GMM SYS (t-2) (t-3)
Industry  # Firms
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

 1 2
1 324 0.415 (0.046) 0.576 (0.040) 0.009 (0.040) 1.014 (0.054) -0.070 (0.263) 0.949 (0.067) 0.460 (0.074) 0.853 (0.256) 1.000 -6.84 -1.18
31 192 0.298 (0.043) 0.625 (0.053) 0.077 (0.028) 1.149 (0.036) -0.771 (0.328) 1.149 (0.097) 1.002 (0.220) -590.9 (76746) 0.972 -5.66 -1.08
Total 516 0.370 (0.036) 0.688 (0.031) -0.058 1.314 (0.036) 0.275 (0.067) 1.369 (0.061) 1.135 (0.148) -8.422 (8.168) 0.966 -7.77 0.75
Regime  = - [1 industry] GMM SYS (t-2) (t-3)
Industry  # Firms
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b  1 2
21 154 0.356 (0.047) 0.647 (0.042) -0.003 (0.030) 1.175 (0.035) -0.632 (0.333) 1.170 (0.076) 1.000 -6.88 -0.27
First-step robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported.
 Formulas of the market imperfection parameter estimates are given in footnote (b) of Table 5.
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Table A.3
Di¤erent dimensions across industries within R = IC-EB
Industry j Code Name
Prot.a
type
Union.b
type
Imp.c
type
Tech.d
type
5 B05-B06 Other food products H M M L
6 C11 Clothing and skin goods M L H L
7 C12 Leather goods and footwear H M H L
8 C20 Publishing, (re)printing M H L L
11 C41 Furniture L M M L
17 E21 Metal products for construction L L L L
18 E22 Ferruginous and steam boilers L L L L
22 E27-E28 Other machinery for specic usage L H H M
23 E31-E35 Electric and electronic machinery M L H M
24 F11-F12 Mineral products H H M M
26 F14 Earthenware products and construction material H M M M
27 F21 Textile art M M M M
28 F22-F23 Textile products and clothing H H H L
33 F46 Transformation of plastic products L L H M
35 F53 Ironware M H L M
36 F54 Industrial service to metal products M L L M
37 F55-F56 Metal products, recuperation H M M L
L: low-type, M: medium-type, H: high-type.
a L: PCM< 16.8% (5 industries), M: 16.8% PCM< 17.7% (6 industries), H: PCM 17.7% (6 industries).
b L: union density< 8.8% (6 industries), M: 8.8% union density< 12.1% (6 industries), H: union density 12.1% (5 industries).
c L: import penetration< 0.19 (5 ind.), M: 0.19 import penetration < 0.34 (7 ind.), H: import penetration  0.34 (5 ind.).
d L (9 industries), M (8 industries).
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Table A.4
Firm analysis: Heterogeneity in firm-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imper. parameter b,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates
Regime  = -
[5715 firms]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b b
SIMPLE
Observed variance b2 0.017 0.018 0.009 0.059 0.050 0.046 0.091 1.936 0.343 5279 441.53
Sampling variance b2 0.002 0.002 0.029 0.049 0.026 0.038 0.047 1.169 0.193 1.57 109 2.83 109
True variance b2 0.015 0.016 0 0.010 0.024 0.008 0.044 0.766 0.150 0 0
F-test 9.039 7.523 0.331 1.212 1.907 1.225 1.941 1.655 1.774 3.37 10−6 1.56 10−7
WEIGHTED
Observed variance b2 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.038 0.044 0.022 0.039 0.847 0.125 1.347 0.018
Sampling variance b2 5.80 10−4 5.10 10−4 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.277 0.035 0.264 0.003
True variance b2 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.024 0.035 0.013 0.027 0.570 0.090 1.083 0.016
F-test 33.27 32.11 3.75 2.656 4.800 2.314 3.276 3.059 3.593 5.103 6.648
MEDIAN
Interquartile observed variance b2 0.016 0.018 0.008 0.058 0.054 0.033 0.057 1.203 0.189 3.089 0.194
Robust sampling variance b2 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.028 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.571 0.077 1.347 0.092
Robust true variance b2 0.015 0.017 0 0.031 0.038 0.013 0.033 0.631 0.112 1.742 0.101
F-test 16.28 18.17 0.606 2.106 3.288 1.665 2.330 2.105 2.456 2.293 2.104
Regime  = -
[1845 firms]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b
SIMPLE
Observed variance b2 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.064 0.052 0.049 0.086 2.497 0.216
Sampling variance b2 0.002 0.003 0.025 0.060 0.031 0.044 0.050 1.625 0.143
True variance b2 0.009 0.012 0 0.003 0.021 0.004 0.036 0.873 0.073
F-test 6.184 5.262 0.394 1.059 1.695 1.098 1.729 1.537 1.512
WEIGHTED
Observed variance b2 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.049 0.046 0.025 0.038 1.212 0.117
Sampling variance b2 6.40 10−4 4.97 10−4 0.005 0.019 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.421 0.033
True variance b2 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.030 0.036 0.014 0.025 0.791 0.084
F-test 18.76 27.92 3.444 2.554 4.514 2.231 3.032 2.879 3.509
MEDIAN
Interquartile observed variance b2 0.011 0.015 0.008 0.069 0.059 0.039 0.058 1.736 0.166
Robust sampling variance b2 0.001 9.38 10−4 0.012 0.035 0.019 0.023 0.026 0.825 0.074
Robust true variance b2 0.010 0.014 0 0.035 0.039 0.016 0.032 0.911 0.092
F-test 9.696 15.65 0.685 1.996 3.045 1.699 2.206 2.104 2.240
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Table A.4 (ctd)
Firm analysis: Heterogeneity in firm-specific output elasticities
³b ´

( = ), joint market imperf. parameter b,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up b () and extent of rent sharing b or labor supply elasticity ³b´

Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates
Regime  = -
[899 firms]
( ) ( ) ()
³b´

³b´

³b´

b  b b b ³b´

SIMPLE
Observed variance b2 0.012 0.020 0.012 0.067 0.061 0.045 0.097 5.405 0.190 6299 34 104
Sampling variance b2 0.002 0.003 0.019 0.059 0.028 0.042 0.046 3.369 0.120 4.74 1010 5.89 1013
True variance b2 0.010 0.017 0 0.008 0.033 0.003 0.051 2.036 0.069 0 0
F-test 5.716 6.974 0.655 1.145 2.192 1.066 2.114 1.604 1.578 1.33 10−7 5.77 10−9
WEIGHTED
Observed variance b2 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.048 0.067 0.020 0.036 1.483 0.102 0.027 0.043
Sampling variance b2 6.30 10−4 3.79 10−4 0.004 0.014 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.461 0.025 0.015 0.020
True variance b2 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.033 0.058 0.012 0.026 1.022 0.077 0.012 0.023
F-test 18.63 43.42 4.582 3.294 7.367 2.487 3.737 3.215 4.117 1.793 2.125
MEDIAN
Interquartile observed variance b2 0.013 0.024 0.012 0.071 0.082 0.029 0.061 2.907 0.161 0.952 3.191
Robust sampling variance b2 0.001 9.36 10−4 0.011 0.028 0.017 0.018 0.026 1.019 0.060 0.204 1.116
Robust true variance b2 0.012 0.023 0.001 0.043 0.065 0.011 0.034 1.887 0.100 0.748 2.074
F-test 12.31 25.38 1.116 2.526 4.691 1.609 2.294 2.852 2.669 4.668 2.857
 Formulas of the market imperfection parameter estimates are given in footnote (b) of Table 5.
 The estimated true variance is computed by adjusting the observed variance for the sampling variability: b2 = b2− b2.
 F-test= 
2

2
: F-statistic for the hypothesis of equality of the estimates (or the computed variables) across firms.
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